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INTRODUCTION

This Article argues that access to aggregated electronic public records for
commercial use should receive protection under the First Amendment in the same
measure as the speech acts the access supports. In other words, we view commercial
access to aggregated public records as an essential means to valuable speech. For
many, however, the taint of the commercial speech doctrine is turning all
"information flows"' into commercial ones. This, in turn, is threatening the access
to government records.
The government keeps records about nearly everything: houses, land, and their
owners; businesses and their owners, investors, and directors; taxes of individuals
and businesses; the estates of the deceased; births, deaths, and marriages; medical
procedures, drug prescriptions, and health histories of veterans, the elderly, and the
poor. This list just scratches the surface. The government uses all these data to
answer questions and make decisions that affect all our lives: how much tax we will
pay, what government services we will receive, where a new road will be built, how
much logging is permissible on public lands, whether doctors can prescribe a new
drug, and so on. These "silos" of data grew up in file cabinets but are increasingly
aggregated in government databases. How can we assess whether the government
is evaluating all of this data properly? The government agencies themselves have
the means and access to review the way that public record data are used, but like
Juvenal, we might wisely ask, "Quis custodiet custodes ipsos?," or "Who will be
guarding the guards?" 2
In practice, public records information is useful in a wide variety of ways,
including supporting investigative reporting, aiding citizens in disputes with the
government, substantiating policy proposals of (often diametrically opposed)
interest groups, and facilitating efficient private transactions.3 Public records access
reduces the cost of credit by supporting rapid and accurate decisionmaking.4 Public
records make possible most real estate transactions, which require public records
to verify the existence, boundaries, and ownership of real property.5 Access to
public records allows the public to verify the identities and qualifications of
individuals licensed by the government to perform certain services or professions.6
Access also permits targeting product and service promotions to those who are

1. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the FirstAmendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149,
1153 (2005). While Professor Richards uses this termto collectively describe collection, use, disclosure,
and telemarketing, this Article limits the meaning of informationflow to requesting and using records.
2. JUVENAL, THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL 78 (Rolfe Humphries trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1958).
3. See Coal. for Sensible Pub. Records Access, PublicBenefits for Open Public Records 1-3,
http://www.cspra.us/downloads/publicbenefits.pdf(last visited June 8.2007). The Coalition for Sensible
Public Records Access is an organization of large, national commercial aggregators of public records,
such as Experian and LexisNexis. See Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access, CSPRA Sponsors,
http://www.cspra.us/sponsors.html (last visited June 8, 2007).
4. Coal. for Sensible Pub. Records Access, Consumer Benefits from Open Public Records 2.
http://www.cspra.us/downloads/consumerbenefits.pdf (last visited June 8, 2007).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 3.
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likely to want the products and services.7 Access to electronic aggregated public
records, therefore, provides important political, social, and economic benefits.
Commercial entities are necessarily involved in the gathering, analysis, and
distribution of public record data because of the complexity of the work and the
financial resources required.8 Individual citizens are in no position to gather and
analyze data available from government agencies; they do not have the specialized
skills or the capital budgets.9 The private sector is our last hope: it has the means
and opportunity to perform the requisite work, but some are disturbed by its profit
motive.
The right of access to public record information is established under the First
Amendment, the federal Freedom of Information Act, and the constitutions and
statutes of many of the states. Many states and the federal government impose
restrictions, however, on those who request and receive public records.
Governments treat requesters differently based on whether or not they are
commercial entities, without regard to the nature of the speech, if any, the
requesters will support using the public record content. Often, the restrictions are
tied to the right of privacy.
The right of privacy with regard to one's personal information also has roots
in the Constitution and federal and state laws. There is no consensus on what
information about a person is subject to this right. It may be only information the
person does not share with anyone, or the right may extend to information the
person shares with fiduciaries, including doctors and lawyers. This is what
Professor Daniel Solove calls the "secrecy paradigm."' ° Solove and others have
criticized the secrecy paradigm, arguing that the law should recognize new rights
of privacy and restrict the use of aggregated government information, even if it is
already in the public domain." Further, commentators argue that information in the
public domain should be eligible for re-privatization to satisfy the expectations of
the subjects of that information. 2
This Article contends that courts, commentators, and legislators support
restrictions on the use of public records because many of these uses suffer under the
taint of commercial speech. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has accorded
commercial speech second-class status under the First Amendment. To obtain First
Amendment protection for purely commercial speech, the speaker has to meet a
higher standard than she would to protect noncommercial speech. Members of the
Court have repeatedly spoken of commercial speech in terms not at all flattering:

7. Id.
8. Coal. for Sensible Pub. Records Access. supra note 3. at 3-4.
9. See id.
10. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:Public Records, Privacy andthe Constitution,86
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (2002).
11. See, e.g.. id. at 1216-17 (concluding that the government should be less restrictive in its
limitations on use of public records, especially because of the threat of viewpoint discrimination).
12. See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138
(2004) (arguing that privacy has been violated if norms, including behavioral expectations about
appropriateness and distribution of information, are not upheld).
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they claim commercial speakers are "hawking" "soap," "shampoo," and "pots. 13
The Court has rarely offered a justification for treating commercial speech in this
way. To be sure, some members of the Court have resisted the commercial speech
doctrine, but the prevailing view is that the Court offers "second-class First
Amendment rights"' 4 to commercial speech.
Data access is only the beginning of the information flow. After a requester
obtains aggregated public record data, she usually processes that data in some way
and then uses it for some final objective. The final objective may be political speech
and therefore will enjoy great protection as speech under the First Amendment.
However, it may not be speech at all, in which case the First Amendment speech
doctrine may not come into play. The commercial requester may not actually be the
final user; the requester may act as a data broker to others who wish to use the data
for their own final objectives. Because commercial intermediaries often stand
between the government record source and the final user, or "speaker," of the
public records, there is no way to know whether the commercial entity is supporting
constitutionally protected speech or purely economic activity.
This Article argues that the right to access public record data should be a given,
and that governments should not place restrictions on requesters at the time they
obtain the public records data. Instead, the information flows should be "regulated
backwards." If the final objective of the user of public record data is speech
accorded high First Amendment protection, the regulation of the information flow
between access to the public record data and the protected speech itself must
withstand First Amendment scrutiny. If the final objective of the user of public
record data is purely economic activity, however, the entire information flow
should be regulated according to the lower standards for economic activity.
As a consequence of these proposals, most regulations of activities like
telephone solicitations and fair credit reporting will continue to pass constitutional
muster. However, most government-imposed restrictions at the point of accessing
public records will not.
This approach is appropriate because, as this Article argues, (1)concerns about
misuse of public records are overstated or misstated; (2) regulations of public
records at the point of access are overreaching; (3) regulating the public record at
the point of use provides an effective answer to many of the legitimate concerns;
and (4) other steps are much more likely to resolve the remaining concerns than
regulating public records at the point of access.
Part 1I of this Article describes the policy grounds for access to public records
and explains how access occurs in the Internet age, providing some vocabulary
along the way. Part III covers some of the limitations imposed on public record
requesters at the point of access and discusses some rationales for restrictions. Part
IV provides an overview of the commercial speech doctrine. Part V offers First
Amendment analysis of the public records information flow, a proposal for

13. See infra text accompanying notes 198. 218, 227. 238.
14. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 786 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).

2007]

COMMERCIAL USE OF AGGREGATED PUBLIC RECORDS

adjudicating restrictions on public records use, and an argument that this approach
is superior to what is currently employed. Part VI answers some of the likely
objections to the proposal, demonstrating that reasonable regulations to protect
privacy, including such regulations as the Fair Credit Reporting Act and National
Do-Not-Call Registry, will have continued validity, and that other efforts may offer
better tools to combat invasions of privacy. Part VII concludes.
I1.

ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS

WHY, How, AND TO WHAT EFFECT?

The reasons for access to public records in a democratic society are many and
may include enhancing government decisionmaking, allowing citizens to assert
their rights, increasing the effectiveness of government administration, increasing
government accountability, encouraging public participation in government
decisionmaking, and exposing corruption.15 Once public access to records is
granted, courts and legislatures, over time, have had to determine the extent to
which the right to access applies to court documents, federal government
documents, and state government documents. The regimes for making public
records available also make reference to who is requesting the records and why.
Therefore, understanding the common uses and objectives for public records is
helpful. It will then be possible to discuss examples of public record use that exhibit
the policy of openness.
A.

The Tradition of Public Records Access

Professor Daniel Solove, a leading commentator on privacy rights, identifies
several key reasons for public access to government records: "(1) to shed sunshine
on governmental activities and proceedings; (2) to find out information about public
officials and candidates for public office; (3) to facilitate certain social transactions,
such as selling property or initiating lawsuits; and (4) to find out information about
other individuals for a variety of purposes."' 6 The notion of shedding light on
government activities is the most immediately appealing of the reasons Professor
Solove provides. In 1977, Professor Vincent Blasi wrote that the "checking value"
of the First Amendment requires thatjournalists have access to documents that help
them examine the workings of government. 17 While Blasi focused primarily on
journalists, his advocacy included the public interest, with journalists as the
intermediaries:
[U]nder the checking value, the interest of the press (and

15. Simon James, The PotentialBenefits of Freedom of Information, in OPEN GOVERNMENT IN
17, 19 29 (Richard A. Chapman & Michael Hunt eds.,
2006).
16. Solove, supra note 10, at 1173.
17. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521. 609-10.
A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTEXT
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ultimately the public) in learning certain information relevant to
the abuse of official power would sometimes take precedence
over perfectly legitimate and substantial government interests
such as efficiency and confidentiality. Thus, the First Amendment
may require that journalists have access as a general matter to
some records, such as certain financial documents, which anyone
investigating common abuses of the public trust would routinely
want to inspect, even though the granting of such access would
undoubtedly entail some costs and risks.... In short, a proponent
of the checking value should treat requests byjournalists to view
government activities and inspect official records as embodying
First Amendment interests of the highest order. 8
Solove's next suggestion-accessing information about public officials and
candidates for office-also has broad appeal. Blasi's checking value suggests the
importance of such information, because in order to avoid electing individuals who
might engage in misconduct, the public needs access to information and records
about candidates, and those records should be open.' 9 Further, "the balance might
be tilted even more in the direction of access if ajournalist could demonstrate that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that certain records contain evidence of
misconduct by public officials."2
Solove's last two suggestions about the importance of access to public records
are facilitating transactions, such as buying and selling real estate or initiating
lawsuits, and enabling access to information about individuals for various other
reasons.2 His examples include tracing ownership and titles, verifying identity,
investigating fraud, locating lost friends and classmates, and scrutinizing child care
professionals."
As with most First Amendment rights, access to public records and meetings
is not absolute; however, there is a long-standing preference to provide access at
both state and federal levels. The idea of openness in government proceedings, in
fact, has a constitutional foundation: the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial. 2 3 Based on English common law tradition,24 the Supreme Court has

18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. See id. at 622. Blasi draws a distinction between "claims relating to initial access to otherwise
unavailable information" and "claims relating to the more vivid transmission of information," such as
information passed via television, audiotapes or photographs. Id. at 610. However, his emphasis seems
to be on the status of the "otherwise unavailable information," rather than the technology used to gather
information in another format. Id.
20. Id.
21. Solove, supra note 10, at 1175 76.
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
24. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) ("The origins of the
proceeding which has become the modem criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back
beyond reliable historical records .... What is significant for present purposes is that throughout its
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recognized First Amendment rights of public access to both criminal25 and civil26
trials. More importantly, the Court has also extended access rights to public records
generated in the judicial process.27
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has protected the publication of public
information lawfully obtained from court or other government records. In 1975, the
Court overturned a Georgia law forbidding the publication of a rape victim's
name. 28 A broadcast news reporter uncovered the victim's name from indictments
the court allowed him to examine; the status of the records as public records was
not disputed.2 9 The Court focused on the narrow question of whether the state could
forbid accurate publication of a name contained in public records and held that the
state could not forbid this publication.3 ° In doing so, the Court placed the burden
on the states to determine whether to release information into the public record
itself:
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial
proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid
public documentation or other exposure of private information.
Their political institutions must weigh the interests in privacy
with the interests of the public to know and of the press to
publish. Once true information is disclosed in public court
documents open to public31inspection, the press cannot be
sanctioned for publishing it.
The outcome was the same in the 1989 case of FloridaStar v. B.J.F.,32 but the
Court advanced different reasons under different circumstances. Under a Florida
law similar to the invalidated Georgia law in Cox Broadcasting, the trial court
found the FloridaStar newspaper civilly liable for publishing the name of a rape
victim, which it obtained from a report the police department published and made

evolution, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe.").
25. Id. at 573 (acknowledging the inherent nature of the public's presence at criminal trials): see
also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside, 478 U.S. 1. 13 (1986)
(extending the right ofpublic access to preliminary criminal hearings); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,
48 (1984) (extending the right of public access to a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence); PressEnterprise Co. v.Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501. 511 (1984) (extending
the right of public access to jury selection proceedings): Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for
Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 07 (1982) (allowing closure of a criminal trial only for a compelling
governmental interest and a narrowly tailored closure).
26. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
27. See, e.g.. Craig v. Harney. 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("There is no special perquisite of the
judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to
suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it.").
28. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
29. Id. at 472-73.
30. Id.at 491.
31. Id.at 496 (footnote omitted).
32. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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available in its own press room.33 Publication of the rape victim's full name ran
afoul of the newspaper's own internal policies.34
Justice Marshall distinguished the case from Cox Broadcastingbecause the
newspaper received the information not from a judicial record, but from a police
report that was not officially a public record.35 Instead, Justice Marshall relied on
Smith v. Daily Mail PublishingCo. 36 where the Court overturned a West Virginia
statute forbidding the publication of the names of juvenile offenders without a
written court order.37 Quoting from Smith, Justice Marshall noted, "'[1]f a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."' 38 Again
relying on the states to safeguard information by not releasing it into a public
record, Justice Marshall went on to note that punishing the press for publishing
lawfully obtained information is unlikely to advance the state's interest in
protecting victims' privacy, and that punishment would be likely to increase the
press's potential "timidity and self-censorship. ',3 The Court has thus
demonstrated that it is willing to protect receipt and publication of truthful
information from government documents. As discussed below, however, this right
of receipt and publication is not absolute, and the interpretations of what comprises
a document
may be questioned, but the fundamental message appears to be one of
40
access.

33. Id. at 527.
34. Id. at 528.
35. Id.at 532.
36. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
37. Id. at 98. 105-06.
38. FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 103).
39. Id.at 534 35 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,496 (1975)). Justice Marshall
returned to the notion that the states should have the burden of ensuring that information was managed
appropriately when he considered the victim's argument that the reports were not officially public
records that must be made available. The fact that the information was not a public record did not mean
that the media could not lawfully receive the information when it was proffered. "As we have noted,
where the government itself provides information to the media, it is most appropriate to assume that the
government had, but failed to utilize, far more limited means of guarding against dissemination than
the extreme step of punishing truthful speech." Id.at 538. In dissent, Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, asserted that Florida had, in fact, tried to control the
dissemination of rape victims' names by amending the state's freedom of information law to exempt
the victims' names. Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting). However, both the police department and the
newspaper erroneously revealed the victim's name. White seems to forgive only the police department's
error:
[A]s this case illustrates, mistakes happen: even when States take measures to
"avoid" disclosure, sometimes rape victims' names are found out. As 1 see it, it
is not too much to ask the press, in instances such as this, to respect simple
standards of decency and refrain from publishing a victim's name, address, and/or
phone number.
Id.
40. We believe this to be true in spite of the Supreme Court's decision in Los Angeles Police
Department v.United Reporting PublishingCorp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). See infra text accompanying
notes 350-63.
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Federal statutes also protect the right to obtain government records. The federal
Freedom of Information Act41 (usually abbreviated FOIA, which is commonly
pronounced to rhyme with the name of the painter Goya), passed in 1966 and
amended several times thereafter,42 creates a limited right of access to information
possessed by executive agencies. The spirit of FO1A is illustrated in the legislative
record by its author and sponsor, the late Representative John Moss:
[O]ur system of government is based on the participation of the
governed, and as our population grows in numbers it is essential
that it also grow in knowledge and understanding. We must
remove every barrier to information about-and understanding
of Government activities consistent with our security if the
American public is to be adequately equipped to4 3fulfill the ever
more demanding role of responsible citizenship.
Access to public records is limited under FOIA by nine exemptions: properly
classified information that could compromise national security interests;
information that might reveal an agency's internal rules and practices; information
specifically exempted by statute; trade secrets; inter- or intra-agency memoranda
normally not available except in litigation; personal and medical information that
"would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"; law
enforcement records under certain specifically defined terms; operating or condition
reports on financial institutions; and geological and geophysical data concerning
wells.44
According to its terms, the section on exemptions "does not authorize
withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except
as specifically stated" in the section.45 Therefore, to withhold information the
government must use one of the nine exemptions to the FO1A. In addition, FOIA
requires the disclosure of "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record" after
redaction of exempt material is completed.46 Congress amended the FOIA in 1996

41. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. II,
111 & 1V 2006)).
42. FOIA was amended in 1974, 1994. and 1996, with changes made in 1976, 1978, and 1984.
and in 1986 the Freedom ofInformation Reform Act was passed. See Jane E. Kirtley, Transparencyand
Accountability in a Time of Terror: The Bush Administration'sAssault on Freedom of Information, II
COMM. L. & POL'Y 479, 481-84 (2006) (discussing the history of FOIA and its amendments).
43. 112 CONG. REc. 13,641 (1966).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d); see also Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of
InformationAct 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise ofPrivacyProtectionOver the PublicInterest
in Knowing What the Government ' Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 511. 514-38 (2006) (discussing in
depth the development of the FOIA and the continued commitment to the presumption of openness
throughout its creation, interpretation, and amendment).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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to include access to records held in electronic formats.4 The FOIA now provides
that a "'record' and any other term used in th[e] section in reference to information
includes any information that would be an agency record subject to the
requirements of this section when maintained by an agency in any format, including
an electronic format."48 Meetings of executive agencies are also presumed to be
open; the Government in the Sunshine Act4 9 provides that "every portion of every
meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation, 50 except under ten
exemptions similar to those of the FOIA.5 1
The FOIA does not limit the use of public records to noncommercial uses;
however, it does provide for standard reasonable charges for search, duplication,
and review for commercial uses. 52 Nonprofit educational and scientific
organizations making noncommercial use of records pay only standard reasonable
charges for duplication.53
All fifty states and the District of Columbia also have open records laws. 4
Some states have open records and meetings provisions in their constitutions. 55 It
is beyond this Article's scope to discuss state open records laws in detail; however,
a discussion of one state is provided for purposes of illustration.
California offers access to government records through a variety of sources. In
passing the California Public Records Act (CPRA), 56 the California legislature
declared that "access to information concerning the conduct of the people's
business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state."'5' The
Act broadly defines records to include "any writing containing information relating
to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any
state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. '58 The CPRA
emphasizes the importance of timely access to public records.5 9

47. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104 231, 110 Stat.
3048 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (f)(2) (2000)).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2).
49. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000)).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (2000).
51. Id. § 552b(c)(1)-(10).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I).
53. Id.§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).
54. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE (2006),
available at http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php (last visited June 11. 2007). The Open Government
Guide bills itself as "a complete compendium of information on every state's open records and open
meetings laws." Id.
55. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 11. § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of the right to examine
documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its
subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of
public disclosure.").
56. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6276.48 (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
57. Id. § 6250 (West 1995).
58. Id.§ 6252(e) (West Supp. 2007).
59. See id § 6259(c) (West 1995) (requiring immediate review by appellate courts of any court
order directing either disclosure or non-disclosure).
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California also has constitutional provisions advancing access.6 ° In November
2004, the people of California passed Proposition 59 by a wide margin.6 Prop. 59,
as it is commonly known, expands public access to meetings and records in a
number of key ways. It establishes access to records and meetings as a
constitutional matter and applies to all government bodies, not just executive
agencies." 2 It mandates narrow construction of state statutes limiting access and,
conversely, mandates a broad construction of statutes providing access.6 3Moreover,
new statutes that seek to limit access must include express findings of the
government interest at stake and the need to protect those government interests.64
Not all states are as generous as California in attempting to make access to public
record easy. More restrictive state laws, particularly those with limitations on
commercial uses of public data, will be discussed below.65 Before delving into those
restrictions, however, it will be helpful to discuss how access to public records
typically works.
B. How It's Done (and Terminology)
It will help to adopt definitions of some terms and to present some examples
of public records and how they are used before continuing this discussion. First,
what does "public records" mean? This Article uses the term "public records" in a
particular sense. At the outset the most pertinent components of the definition are
information and documents in the possession of the government which the
government uses to make decisions about policies, treatment of citizens, and
delivery of services. This information is "data., 66 This is consistent with data's
dictionary definition as "[flactual information, especially information organized for
analysis or used to reason or make decisions., 6' Because this Article focuses on
data in the possession of governments, "government data" means "all data
collected, created, received, maintained or disseminated by any government entity
regardless of its physical form, storage media or conditions of use. '68 "Government
entity" means any state or federal agency, statewide or nationwide system under

60. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (b)(1).
61.
See Cal. Secretary of State, 2004 California General Election Proposition 59,
http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/mapR059.htm (last visited June 11, 2007) (indicating that
Proposition 59 passed with 83.4% of the vote).
62. CAL. CONST. art. 1. § 3(b)(1) ("The people have the right of access to information concerning
the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of
public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.").
63. Id. § 3(2).
64. Id.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 96-98.
66. Note that we have not adopted a convention throughout this Article to refer to data always as
a singular noun or always as a plural noun. Our feeling is that the context suggests whether we are
talking about data as singular or plural.
67. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 475 (3d. ed. 1992).
68. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.02 Subd. 7 (West Supp. 2007).
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government control, or a political subdivision.6 9
These definitions are loosely based on the Minnesota Government Data
Practices Act (MGDPA).7 ° For purposes of discussing a topic of national scope, it
would be preferable to use a definition of government data from a law applicable
throughout the United States. The definitions section applicable to the federal FOIA
uses the term "agency record" as the operative identifier of things potentially
available under its terms. 71 Regrettably, however, FOIA defines "agency 72 but does
not define "record." There certainly has been litigation about whether certain things
are "record" 73and agency records under FOIA, but the MGDPA definition and term
provides a broader, clearer starting point.
Government data come in a variety of flavors. One important distinction is
whether a particular piece of data permits the identification of a natural person to
whom it refers. The definition of "personal information" therefore must reflect this
distinction:
[A]ll government data in which any individual is or can be
identified as the subject of that data, unless the appearance of the

69. See id.§ 13.02 Subd. 7a.
70. Id. §§ 13.01-13.89 (West Supp. 2007).
71. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(2)(D) (2000) (referring to "agency... records, regardless of form
or format").
72. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000).
"[A]gency" means each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include
(A) the Congress:
(B) the courts of the United States:
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United
States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia
or except as to the requirements of section 552 of this title-(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of
representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes
determined by them:
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in
occupied territory; or
(H)functions conferred by [other sections ofthe U.S. Code not at issue
here].
Id.
73. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 135 (D. Kan. 1971) (noting the plaintiff's
argument that the rifle Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly used to kill John F. Kennedy was an agency record
in the possession of the United States.).
74. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1489 90 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (holding that the test to determine the status of an alleged agency record is "whether the
documents were (1) in the agency's control; (2) generated within the agency: (3) placed into the
agency's files; and (4) used by the agency 'for any purpose"') (citing Kissinger v. Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 157 (1980)); cf MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.02 Subd. 7 (defining
government data broadly to encompass data collection, creation, reception, maintenance, and
distribution "by any government entity").
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name or other identifying data can be clearly demonstrated to be
only incidental to the data and the data are not accessed by the
name or other identifying data of any individual.75
With regard to personal information, there is a further distinction of whether the
data contains personal information that should be treated as non-public because, for
example, it concerns the medical or financial characteristics of the individual, such
as Medicare records or need-based assistance applications, or because it concerns
the personnel files of government employees. Other examples include Social
Security Numbers and bank account information, disclosure of which could greatly
facilitate criminal conduct. This non-public subcategory of personal information is
usually defined under a statute, rule, or policy to address privacy concerns.
Some government data are unavailable under freedom of information laws for
a host of other reasons, including data relating to ongoing criminal investigations,
data related to intelligence and military matters, and trade secrets disclosed to the
government by private actors. 7' This Article refers to data unavailable for these and
other similar reasons as "government secrets" information in the possession ofthe
government where a statute, rule, or public policy provides for nondisclosure,
sometimes including nondisclosure even to the individual subjects of the data.
Government secrets include personal information as well as other
data government secrets are by definition non-public.
At last then, this Article is concerned with "public records," which means all
government data, except to the extent they constitute (1) government secrets,
(2) non-public personal information, and (3) personal information excepted from
disclosure under an applicable statute, rule, or policy.
These definitions, taken together, create a hypothetical model of a freedom of
information law. The following are examples of government data that would be
public records under this model, as well as some exceptions:
1. Property characteristic information and personal information (including
name and address) about the owner and taxpayer of each parcel of real
property would be public records where the county assessor gathers them
to assess the taxable value of real estate and to bill the appropriate payer.
The public record designation extends to electronic data maintained on

75. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.02 Subd. 5 (using this definition for the statutorily defined term
"data on individuals"). The statute further defines "individual":
[A] natural person. In the case of a minor or an individual adjudged mentally
incompetent, "individual" includes a parent or guardian or an individual acting as
a parent or guardian in the absence of a parent or guardian, except that the
responsible authority shall withhold data from parents or guardians, or individuals
acting as parents or guardians in the absence of parents or guardians, upon request
by the minor if the responsible authority determines that withholding the data
would be in the best interest of the minor.
Id. § 13.02 Subd. 8.
76. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
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behalf of the assessor by a third party contractor.
An environmental impact assessment, and the underlying data, performed
by a state department of natural resources would be a public record when
it is used for internal policy-making. It might not be a public record where
the department prepares it in anticipation of litigation against a private
developer. In other words, to the extent it would not be discoverable, it
probably would not be a public record.
3. A police report regarding an accident, including the names and addresses
of parties and witnesses to the accident, would be a public record.
4. A database maintained by a state agency showing each prescription made
to a person under eighteen years of age for any drug to treat hyperactivity
would be a public record, including the date each prescription was filled,
the age and gender of each patient, the brand and generic names of the
drug prescribed and its dosage, and the name and address of each filling
pharmacy. The name or full address of the patient or prescribing physician
would not be considered part of the public record. Instead, this situation
would call for "abstracting" for those characteristics.7 In most cases,
providing the ZIP code portion of the patient's and physician's addresses
should prevent association of any particular record with any particular
patient or doctor, but still allow analysis at the ZIP code level for insights
into prescription patterns for these drugs.78 Depending on how up-to-date
the records are, redaction of information about the pricing of the
medications may be appropriate to prevent the aggregated current pricing
information of competitors to be used for price fixing."
2.

The determinations in these examples are based on a judgment about whether
personal information should be part of the public record. The examples are for
discussion purposes only, recognizing that some jurisdictions would include
personal information where the examples do not, and others may redact personal
information where the examples would include it. This is not a trivial matter. In
fact, a significant debate about public records should occur regarding what
information the government collects, which parts of the records it redacts, and
which characteristics it abstracts from the records. 80
Defining the kinds of government data that are public records puts us at the
beginning of an information flow. To sketch out the remainder of the information

77. See infra note 83.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
79. See, e.g..In re Carbon Black Antitrust Litig.. 2005-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74.695. 101,352-53
(D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2005) (finding that competitor sharing of price information is evidence in support
of a claim of price fixing under the Sherman Act).
80. This specific discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, as the principles that guide
decisions about what types of public records are available are not driven by First Amendment speech
doctrine but rather by public records access doctrine under federal and state constitutions and statutes.
See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding that media access to penal
institutions was a legislative question).
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flow requires asking several questions: who will obtain the records from the
government, what will they do to the records, and to what ultimate uses will the
records be put? The people and businesses that request public records from the
government "requesters" do so for a wide variety of reasons. Some examples
are offered here in an effort to classify the requesters and their intended uses. In
general, requesters may request records in any number and regarding any subject.
In some cases, a requester may be an individual or business seeking a single record
relating to him-, her-, or itself, that is, a record of which the requester is the subject.
For example, a taxpayer may seek a copy of her recent tax return to verify that it
included a schedule that is now the subject of a dispute with the revenue
department. These requesters are "subject-requesters." This category does not
include requesters who merely have an interest in the subject of a record. So, for
example, the owner of a parcel of land is not the subject-requester of a statecommissioned valuation of that land.
Requesters seek individual records for a variety of reasons. A subject-requester
may require a record to mediate some aspect of her relationship with the
government (e.g., the tax dispute example given above) or with a private institution
(e.g., to correct a mistake on her credit report). A subject-requester may seek a
record for purely personal reasons (e.g., to attempt to verify the details of her birth).
Other subject-requester uses are possible. Other requesters, too, may seek a single
record for a variety of reasons. For example, a creditor securing its loan of funds
with the real estate of a debtor may wish to obtain a copy of the satisfaction of an
earlier mortgage on the debtor's property.
The term "aggregated public records" refers to collections of two or more, but
usually many more, records of the same type. These might include the records of
children's prescriptions or real property records. Aggregated records tend to raise
the greatest privacy concerns among commentators. 81 Because they are generally
available in electronic form, they provide the possibility of being joined to other
databases to create what Professor Solove calls "digital biograph[ies]" of data
subjects. 8 2 Though it is possible that a subject-requester might seek aggregated
public records, this is probably not the most common circumstance. 83 Privacy
concerns are thus heightened, as the predominant users of aggregated records are
not the subjects of the records.
Aggregated public records have a wide variety of uses which fall into several
broad categories: "research uses," where the requester intends to analyze record
data and publish general conclusions, "redistribution," which is distribution to third
parties who put it to some other use, "solicitation" of a record's subject, and
"operational use," which is the requester's internal use to facilitate operations or
transactions. Each of these uses, in turn, may arise in a variety of objective
contexts. For example, a university researcher in epidemiology might obtain

81. See infra text accompanying notes 146-51.
82. Solove, supra note 10, at 1141.
83. It is imaginable, however, that a business that engages in frequent transactions with the
government would seek an aggregation of records from the government relating to those transactions.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 935

records upon which she directly performs analysis and research (research use). She
might also solicit subjects of public records to take part in a study based upon the
subjects' presumed characteristics (solicitation). She might use public records as
an aid in operating a clinical trial (operational use). Finally, she might publish the
public records in a database on a departmental web site for use and examination by
other scholars (redistribution). The researcher's objectives are academic, but her
uses of the records run the gamut. Similarly, a political party might obtain public
records to solicit contributions, to redistribute them to an affiliated party or political
action committee, or to perform research and analysis in support of a party position.
Objectives of public record use are as varied as human endeavors:
philanthropy, business transactions, academic research, research targeted at
developing marketable products, public information through the press and media,
politics, and others. Other objective and use combinations are possible: a business
that performs background checks on individuals conducts research using public
records and redistributes them to its client; a newspaper that redistributes details on
all home sales by publishing them also performs research with that information to
present an overview of the housing market; or a title company that collects detailed
information about real estate transactions and property liens to efficiently
underwrite title insurance policies also redistributes access to the collected data to
other businesses for a fee.
C. The Valuable Objectives of Uses of Public Records
Consider the following lead from a 2002 ChicagoSun-Times article by reporter
Mark Skertic:
Nobody knows what long-term damage drugs such as Ritalin
can do to the fast-growing brains of very small children. For that
reason alone, federal regulators and pharmaceutical companies
don't recommend giving these drugs to children under 6.
That hasn't stopped some local doctors. A Sun-Times
analysis of prescriptions written in the Chicago area over 18
months reveals 4,145 prescriptions for Ritalin and other forms of
methylphenidate for children age 5 and younger. Of those, 53
were written for infants who had not yet reached their first
birthday. 4
A ChicagoSun-Times reporter created this news article, containing information
clearly of interest to the public, by using public records data gathered from "state
statistics on prescriptions, U.S. census population data, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration drug usage data and Internal Revenue Service income data., 8 5 Such

84. Mark Skertic, Some Infants Get MedicationDespiteAdvice ofExperts. CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr.
21,2002, at 14A.
85. Compiling the Data. CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, at 12A.
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reporting, commonplace in maj or newspapers and broadcast organizations, is called
computer-assisted reporting (CAR) and "is at the heart of public service journal ism
and of vigilant daily reporting whether in education, business, government,
environment or any other topic."" Without access to aggregated public records,
such stories at worst, would be impossible, and at best, would consume months, if
not years, of gathering, compiling, entering, and analyzing data. Other CAR stories
include a 1995 News & Observer Pulitzer Prize-winning series on the North
Carolina hog industry, 8 a 2005 Washington Post story on the Department of
Homeland Security's lack of proper supervision of the billions of dollars handed
out in contracts for security systems," and a 2005 Florida Sun-Sentinel series
which examined rampant fraud and waste by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) after Hurricane Frances, including $330 million of FEMA money
spent in communities that suffered no damage from the hurricane.8 9 Other actual
and possible beneficial uses of public records are outlined above. 9 But despite the
benefits that access to public records offers, there are numerous restrictions in
place, particularly on commercial uses of public records.
111.

EXISTING AND PROPOSED LIMITATIONS ON COMMERCIAL PUBLIC RECORD USE

Commercial requesters of public records are subject to challenges not faced by
the subject-requester or by the noncommercial requester. Both statutes andjudicial
precedent impose additional limitations on the commercial requester. The burdens
and effects of these limitations have varied over time and location.
A.

Limitations Imposed

Freedom of information laws impose different conditions and fees on
commercial requesters and may not allow them to have the same information as
noncommercial requesters. Courts concern themselves with the question of whether
a commercial requester should be treated differently than a requester that is a
traditional media company. Commentators and scholars claim that (1)the risks of
commercially aggregated data argue for decreased disclosure to commercial
requesters or increased restrictions on them; (2) the potentially unexpected
consequences of commercial aggregation and disclosure should allow persons to
recapture the privacy of information disclosed to the government in order to prevent

86. BRANT HOUSTON, COMPUTER-ASSISTED REPORTING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 5 (3d ed. 2004).
87. See, e.g.. The Power of Pork, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 19, 1995. at Al
(introducing and highlighting a five-part series on the hog industry from a variety of perspectives): see
also 1996 Pulitzer Prize-Public Service, http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1996/publicservice/works/about.html (last visited June 11,2007).
88. Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Scott Highan, ContractorAccused ofOverbilling U.S., WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 2005. at Al.
89. Sally Kestin, Megan O'Matz, John Maines & Jon Burstein, FEMA: A Legacy of Waste, SUNSENTINEL, Sept. 18, 2005.
90. See discussion supra Parts 1. ILIB, and II.C.
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it from being used in a way the persons do not want; and (3) public record access
and use can and should be restricted just as any other commercial activity. To be
sure, these concerns are not universal; some states have laws that prohibit a
government entity to enquire as to the requester's proposed use of the data9' or even
as to the requester's identity. 92
State freedom of information laws differ in their treatment of requests made for
commercial purposes.93 While in the District of Columbia94 or Virginia95 a request
for records made for commercial use does not bar their disclosure, in some other
states such a request would be denied entirely. In Kansas, for example, a requester
may not use lists of names or addresses of either individuals or businesses obtained
under the Kansas Open Records Act to sell goods or services.96 Public information
cannot be used in Rhode Island "to solicit for commercial purposes or to obtain a
commercial advantage over the party furnishing that information to the public
body." 97 In some cases, commercial users of public records are charged additional
fees.98 As noted above, the federal FOIA also permits additional charges for records

91. Neither the California Public Records Act (CPRA) nor the Minnesota Government Data
Practices Act (MGDPA) generally restricts uses of data. The CPRA "does not allow limitations on
access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record
is otherwise subject to disclosure." CAL. GoV'T CODE § 6257.5 (West Supp. 2007). However, an
amendment to the CPRA does require those seeking addresses of arrested individuals to certify that the
requesters are among five classes of authorized requesters and will not use the information in an
unauthorized manner, such as for commercial solicitation. Id. § 6254(f)(3); see also Los Angeles Police
Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp.. 528 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1999) (upholding this section's validity).
The MGDPA also does not require a requester to state a purpose for the data use. A separate section
states that"[lull convenience and comprehensive accessibility shall be allowed to researchers including
historians, genealogists and other scholars to carry out extensive research and complete copying of all
records containing government data except as otherwise expressly provided by law." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.03 Subd. 2(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
92. The CPRA does not differentiate among requesters; if a record is public, all may see it. See
State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 350 (1992). Similarly. the MGDPA
allows "a person" to request public data. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.03 Subd. 3(a).
93. See generally REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 54 (detailing the
varying state practices on freedom of information laws).
94. See Dunhill v. Dir., 416 A.2d 244. 246. 248 (D.C. 1980) (finding that disclosure was not
prohibited when an individual sought information to create a mailing list of elderly citizens).
95. Associated Tax Serv., Inc. v. Fitzpatrick, 372 S.E.2d 625, 629 (Va. 1988) ("We conclude in
light of the statutory language that the purpose or motivation behind a request is irrelevant to a citizen's
entitlement to requested information.").
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-230(a) (Supp. 2005) ("No person shall knowingly sell, give or receive,
for the purpose of selling or offering for sale any property or service to persons listed therein, any list
of names and addresses contained in or derived from public records .... ); see also Data Tree, LLC
v. Meek, 109 P.3d 1226. 1240 (Kan. 2005) (holding that the requester could be charged reasonable fees
under the Kansas Open Records Act for the redaction of Social Security numbers, mothers' maiden
names, and birth dates from aggregated records).
97. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-6 (1997).
98. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.03 Subd. 3(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007) (allowing an agency
to charge additional reasonable fees if the request is for data with commercial value and is part of a
database created with a large expenditure of public funds); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(E)(1)
(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2006) (indicating that non-newsgathering, commercial requests to the
Department of Motor Vehicles may have an increased cost).
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to be used for commercial purposes.99
There is significant theoretical support for the rights of access to public
documents at all levels of government. However, these rights are far from absolute.
The Supreme Court has been deferential to lower courts' control of their judicial
documents. For example, at issue in Nixon v. Warner Communications,Inc.' 00 was
a request by broadcasters to obtain the tapes from the trial of seven individuals
indicted in the Watergate break-in for purposes of copy, broadcast, and sale.' 0 '
While touting the importance of public access,' °2 the Court noted that this access
was never intended to be absolute:
Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files,
and access has been denied where court files might have become
a vehicle for improper purposes. For example, the common-law
right of inspection has bowed before the power of a court to
insure that its records are not "used to gratify private spite or
promote public scandal" through the publication of "the
painful
13
and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case."'
The Court did not have to engage in a balancing test, however, as it had the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. °4 This congressional act
required an administrator to take control of President Richard Nixon's recordings
and other documents, process them, return the private documents to the President,
and make available other historical material for future litigation and eventual public
use. °5 The broadcasters wanted the materials released immediately. The Court
refused to make that decision for the administrator and left the question of the
"constitutionality and statutory validity of any access scheme finally
implemented"'0 6 for future consideration.
Further, the Court could find no constitutional or common law right of access
to the records in this "concededly singular case."'0 7 Admittedly, most cases are not
as singular as this one, where Congress passed a law to address an individual set of

99. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
100. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
101. 1d.at 594.
102. Id. at 597-98.
It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and
copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents.... The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling
access has been found, for example. in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye
on the workings of public agencies, and in a newspaper publisher's intention to
publish information concerning the operation of government.
Id.(footnote and citations omitted).
103. Id. at 598 (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893)).
104. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
105. Id.§§ 101-02; see Nixon, 435 U.S. at 604 05.
106. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608.
107. Id.
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documents that is unique in American history. It is more common for courts to try
to strike a balance between individual privacy rights and the public's interest in
access to records.
The Court came down unanimously on the side of privacy interests in Reno v.
Condon,"°8 slapping the hands of states who sold drivers' license information to
other businesses. Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994
(DPPA) 10 9 to prevent states from selling drivers' personal information, and South
Carolina challenged the act's validity. This case essentially turned on a federalism
question: did the federal government's passage of the DPPA violate the Tenth" 0
and Eleventh.1. Amendments?" 2 Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the
Court that the matter was a Commerce Clause issue and thus properly regulated by
the federal government.' 13However, Rehnquist did note that "[t]he DPPA regulates
the States as the owners of data bases,"' 14 thus potentially opening the door for
additional federal regulations on state public records.
Perhaps one ofthe most significant precedents for denying access to aggregated
data contained in electronic records comes from the 1989 Supreme Court decision
in United States Departmentof Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press."5 The Reporters Committee and a broadcast journalist made a FOIA request
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal rap sheets of four members
of aPennsylvania family with alleged connections to organized crime." 6 The Court
came down on the side of the privacy rights of the single family member still alive,
indicating that the FOIA is intended to keep track of government actions, not to
make the federal government a clearinghouse for personal information of all kinds
that it gathers." 7 Moreover, Justice John Paul Stevens added, the government has
an interest in keeping certain data in "practical obscurity," particularly when it has
compiled the data:

108. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
109. Pub. L. No. 103-322 tit. xxx, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 25
(2000)). Congress passed the DPPA in response to the murder of actress Rebecca Shaeffer outside her
Los Angeles home in 1989. See Aaron Chambers, ConsumerPrivacy Concerns Not TranslatingInto
New Law, CHI DAILY LAW BULL., Apr. 21, 2001. at 3. Her murderer hired aprivate investigator, and
the investigator used California drivers' license records to locate her address. Id.It is interesting to note
that even if the DPPA had been in place at the time of Shaeffer's murder, it would not have prevented
the investigator from obtaining her address, as "any licensed private investigative agency or licensed
security service" is permitted to acquire these records. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8).
110. U.S. CONST.amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
111. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
112. Condon, 528 U.S. at 147.
113. Id. at 148-49.
114. Id. at 151.
115. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
116. Id.at 757.
117. See id. at 773.
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The privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rapsheet information will always be high. When the subject of such
a rap sheet is a private citizen and when the information is in the
Government's control as a compilation, rather than as a record of
"what the Government is up to," the privacy interest protected by
Exemption 7(c) is in fact at its apex while the FOIA-based public
interest in disclosure is at its nadir. 118
This case is striking for several reasons. First, it is troubling that compiled
public data in the form of an FBI rap sheet should be withheld; Stevens admitted
that "much rap-sheet information is a matter of public record.""' 9 In addition, he
suggested that aggregations of information containing public records data should
raise more privacy concerns than individual government records:
But the issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise hardto-obtain information alters the privacy interest implicated by
disclosure of that information. Plainly there is a vast difference
between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police
stations throughout the country and a computerized summary
located in a single clearinghouse of information. 2 '
Stevens did not expound upon this "vast difference" except to note that the passage
of the Privacy Act of 1974121 occurred "largely out of concern over 'the impact of
computer data banks on individual privacy."" ' 21 2 Under Justice Stevens's "practical
obscurity" doctrine, a hard-working journalist could assemble a dossier on a local
individual's criminal activity from "a diligent search of [probably paper]
courthouse files' ' 123 and other documents and disclose it freely, while a reporter
hoping to use more efficient means would be denied similar disclosure. This
appears to be an impractical obscurity and serves little purpose. This case was
decided pre-Internet, so some hope exists that the Court will revise its views at its
next opportunity.
Often, courts strike a balance in favor of privacy, particularly when the court
narrowly construes the public purpose of access to documents. Such were the
124
circumstances in two the Second Circuit cases entitled UnitedStates v. Amodeo.

118. Id.at 780.
119. Id. at 753.
120. Id. at 764.
121. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp.
IV 2006)).
122. Reporter's Comm.. 489 U.S. at 766.
123. Id. at 764.
124. 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 51 (2d Cir. 1995) (Amodeo If); 44 F.3d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Amodeo 1)(interpreting the common law doctrine of access to judicial records and citing federal case
law, but not discussing federal or state statutes).
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lnAmodeo I, the court asked whether a certain document qualified as a true judicial
document subject to common law disclosure. 12 5 The court applied a functional test:
We think that the mere filing of a paper or document with the
court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document
subject to the right of public access. We think that the item filed
must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and
useful in the judicial process in order for it to be designated a
judicial document.126
Using this "relevant and useful" test, the court in Amodeo I found that an exhibit
in question containing names and other identifying information in a union case was
indeed a judicial document and remanded the case to the district court for
consideration as to whether access to the document should be restricted. 27 On a
subsequent appeal, the court in Amodeo II found that, upon balancing the
presumption of access against the countervailing concerns for law enforcement,
28
judicial efficiency, and personal privacy, the document should not be disclosed.'
However, the Amodeo line of reasoning has not been widely adopted, and the
Supreme Court has not embraced the "relevant and useful" test advanced by the
Second Circuit.
Two contrasting state court cases help to illustrate the disparate perspectives
that states hold on the commercial use of public records. A 2005 New York case,
Property Tax Reduction Consultants, Inc. v. Township of Islip,1 29 interpreted the
New York Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) provision that prohibited "sale or
release of lists of names and addresses if such lists would be used for commercial
or fund-raising purposes."' 30 The requester, Property Tax Reduction Consultants,
explained its business as being "'engage[d] in the business of property tax
consultation and offer[ing] service [sic] to residential homeowners who may
qualify for tax reductions by representing such property owners in Small Claims
Assessment Review proceedings."""31 The New York appellate court found that the
company's request for all of the township's "'property inventory records[,
s]pecifically, the property square footage, bathroom count and miscellaneous data
thereon ' , 132 was intended for commercial use; the
township could therefore refuse
133
it under FOIL's noncommercial use provision.
On the other end of the spectrum is Microdecisions, Inc. v. Skinner, 134 a 2004
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130.
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134.

Amodeo 1, 44 F.3d at 145.
Id.
Id. at 147-48.
Amodeoll, 71 F.3dat 1051 53.
799 N.Y.S.2d 576 (App. Div. 2005).
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.2(b)(iii) (McKinney 2001).
Property Tax Reduction Consultants,799 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
Id. at 577 78.
Id. at 578.
889 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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Florida appellate court case with a more expansive view of public access.
Microdecisions requested from the Collier County property appraiser, Abe Skinner,
copies of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps that he had made as part of
his official duties.'35 Skinner provided electronic copies to Microdecisions but
included a license agreement that claimed copyright on the maps and required
royalty payments if the maps were used for commercial purposes. 131 In finding for
Microdecisions, the Florida court noted that no Florida statute permitted the county
appraiser to hold copyright in works created by his office. 137 The court also
emphasized the long-standing Florida tradition of strong open-records access and
the fact that the commercial purpose of the use has no place in determining access
to Florida public records:
Moreover, the fact that a person seeking access to public records
wishes to use them in a commercial enterprise does not alter his
or her rights under Florida's public records law. Since 1905, it has
been clear that public records may be used in a commercial,
profit-making business without the payment of additional fees.'38
The county appraiser, therefore, could not claim copyright in the maps and could
not demand royalty payments if they were used for commercial purposes under the
Florida Public Records Law. The court ordered summary judgment in favor of
Microdecisions. 139 The Florida court noted a contrasting case from New York,
County of Suffolk v. FirstAmerican Real Estate Solutions,4 ° where the Second
Circuit held that New York law did not prevent the holding of copyrights in GIS
maps created by a county. 4 ' But, as the Microdecisions court succinctly pointed
out, "New York law is not Florida law."' 42
B. Rationales Offeredfor Restricting Public RecordAccess
Scholarly examination of the use of public records often addresses the dangers
this use may pose to privacy. The predominant arguments center on the possibility
of identity theft and misuse of aggregated data in credit, employment, or housing
decisions. Some commentators also raise the specter of a dehumanizing effect or
of Big Brother collecting complete information on citizens.
Professor Solove argues that the collection, storage, and consolidation of data
in government databases poses an imminent threat to privacy.143 He notes that the

135. Id. at 873.

136. Id.
137. Id.at 875.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 876.

140. 261 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001).
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at 195.
142. Microdecisions,889 So. 2d at 876.
143. See Solove, supra note 10, at 1139-40.
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threat is new because new technologies make it easy to find and aggregate records.
This situation is different than the era in which the current approach to public
records access was instituted.' 44 He attacks what he calls the "secrecy paradigm,"
which he describes as "the longstanding notion
that there is no claim to privacy
' 45
when information appears in a public record."'
Solove says that individual details about a subject in a public record, including
"one's race, marital status, party affiliation, property values, and so on," are
innocuous.' He argues, however, that taking these innocuous pieces of information
together can "begin to paint a portrait of a person's life.' 147 Solove posits that the
use of these "digital biograph[ies]" results in "a growing dehumanization,
powerlessness, and vulnerability for individuals."' 48 Solove paints a dire picture
without citing any authorities to support the broad claims:
A growing number of large corporations are assembling dossiers
on practically every individual by combining information in
public records with information collected in the private sector
such as one's purchases, spending habits, magazine subscriptions,
web surfing activity, and credit history. Increasingly, these
dossiers of fortified public record information are sold back to
government agencies for use in investigating people.' 49
Two questions immediately occur with regard to this passage. First, without
specific examples, it is difficult to see to what extent public record data is central
in these "dossiers of fortified public record information." Many individuals would
probably be distressed if information about their credit card purchases, spending
habits, magazine subscriptions, web surfing activity, and credit history were widely
available. But none ofthese things appears in the public record. 150 Second, Solove's
comment overlooks the fact that distributing information about consumers' credit
card purchases, magazine subscriptions, web surfing activity, and credit history is
subject to restrictions in statutes and regulations 15' and in agreements, such as
privacy and credit agreements, between consumers and their business partners.
Professor Solove presents a number of incidents he claims substantiate his
argument that access to public records and commercial use of them need to be
restricted. However, the instances Solove identifies do not support the argument
that public records are being misused, let alone an argument that access to them

144. Id. at 1139.
145. Id. at 1140.
146. Id. at 1141.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1140.
150. To the extent this type of information were to appear in government data, we urge that it
should be redacted before the data are delivered as public records. See infra text accompanying notes
301 04 for an example of how this process could go horribly wrong.
151. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000 & Supp. 2004).
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should be restricted. For example, he discusses the case of a Maryland woman
wrongfully charged with a crime, but whose name remained on Maryland's
criminal records database. 5 2 It took her several years-and multiple denials or
dismissals from employment positions as a result of her erroneous criminal
record-to clear her name from the database.1 3 But the error in that case was the
government's own, not that of a commercial aggregator of records." 4
Professor Solove also identifies the so-called "Nuremburg Files" case as an
example of the dangers of public records, claiming: "[t]he Nuremberg Files case
illustrates the dangers created from the increased access to public record
information."' 5 The Nuremberg Files involved a group opposed to abortion, which
published "wanted"-style posters depicting individual doctors who performed
abortions and also posted information about doctors who performed abortions on
its web site.' 56 According to Solove, information on the web site included "names,
photos, Social Security numbers, home addresses, descriptions of [the doctors']
cars, and information about their families."' 5
A review of five court opinions in the Nuremberg Files case, including three
at the district court 58 and two at the Ninth Circuit, 59 shows no reference to Social
Security numbers or information about doctors' families and children. In fact, all
of the information to which the district and circuit courts referred could easily be
obtained from the phone book or by following the doctor for a day and
photographing her. 6 ' Nowhere in any of these opinions does a court say or suggest

152. Solove, supra note 10, at 1189-90.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1190.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 1130, 1153, 1155 (D. Or. 1999) (granting apermanent injunction against defendants including
445 findings of fact): Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1195 (D. Or. 1998) (disposing of defendants' motions for summary
judgment); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 945
F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996) (ruling on defendants' motions to dismiss and for judgment on the
pleadings).
159. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 244
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001), affd en banc, 290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the panel
decision in all respects except for computation of punitive damages).
160. It is possible that the court opinions do not refer to all the information on the web site and
posters; however, research on news stories that could back up the claims that the other sensitive
information appeared on the web site did not show results. The trial court identified photographs,
telephone numbers, addresses, physical descriptions, and descriptions of the cars of the doctors. Planned
Parenthood,945 F. Supp. at 1363. The court also indicated that the date of birth of one doctor appeared
on defendants' infamous Deadly Dozen list. Id.This piece of information might have come from a
public record, but it might also have been available on a web site or in other publications to which the
doctor provided information. For example, some lawyers featured on the Martindale-Hubbell web site
are listed with their dates of birth. See, e.g.. Martindale-Hubbell. Private Practice Lawyer Profile for
Scott Moise, http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/Lawyer Locator/home.xml (enter "Scott" in
the "First Name" field and "Moise" in the "Last Name" field; then follow "Search" hyperlink; then
follow "Elizabeth Scott Moise" hyperlink) (last visited June 29, 2007) (giving Scott Moise's birth date
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that the anti-abortion organization obtained information from doctors through
public records or from data brokers marketing public records.
Solove further proposes that governments should restrict access to government
records from certain types of users and impose conditions on the users regarding
their uses of the records. 6 ' Addressing concerns about viewpoint discrimination,
he proposes "curtail[ing] broad categories of uses (i.e., commercial, information
brokering, further disclosure, and so on) rather than narrow categories, which often
single out particular viewpoints."' 6 2 He continues: "[F]or example, governments
should not restrict access to public records to those who wish to use the information
to advocate for certain causes rather than others. Nor could the government restrict
access based on the particular beliefs or ideas of the person or entities seeking
access to the information."' 63 Professor Solove does not address, however, the
extent to which his proposal would cause power to accrue to the government. For
example, restrictions on commercial use of public records in certain states would
now prevent an attorney specializing in criminal defense from mailing an offer to
represent a defendant to the defendant's address appearing on a public record. Note
the inconsistency inherent in the fact that the defendant's name and address might
appear in the newspaper, typically regarded as a noncommercial use, from which
the attorney could copy it and use it freely. It is difficult to see whose interests,
other than the government's, are served by putting obstacles between a criminal
defendant and a defense attorney.' 64
Rather than attacking misuses of public records, real or imagined, Professor
Helen Nissenbaum argues for the concept of contextual integrity as a justification
16 5
for viewing information that is public in some contexts as being private in others.
Nissenbaum makes her argument particularly with regard to public surveillance.' 66
Contextual integrity is a social theory which "involves a far more complex domain
of social spheres (fields, domains, contexts) than the one that typically grounds
privacy theories, namely, the dichotomous spheres of public and private."' 6
Nissenbaum argues that public policy discussions surrounding privacy are
founded upon three principles: "(1) limiting surveillance of citizens and use of
information about them by agents of government, (2) restricting access to sensitive,
personal, or private information, and (3) curtailing intrusions into places deemed
private or personal."' 68 She argues that court opinions overemphasize the third
principle at the expense of the first and second. For example, some court opinions

as October 3, 1950).
161. Solove, supra note 10, at 1216.
162. Id.
163. Id.at 1216 17.
164. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Lawyer Advertising and the Dignity of the Profession,59
ARK. L. REV. 437, 441-45 (2006) (discussing the historical case law on attorney solicitation).
165. See Nissenbaum. supra note 12. at 164.
166. See id. at 119.
167. Id. at 124.
168. Id. at 125.
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hold that materials obtained from a subject's garbage are not private.169 This focus,
says Nissenbaum, illustrates a fixation on the fact that getting to the garbage did not
require an intrusion on the subject's private property but overlooks
the principles
17
of limiting surveillance and protecting sensitive information. 0
In the public records context, Nissenbaum argues that the Internet raises
particular issues of context with regard to public records and private information:
"the issue of placing [the records] online does raise troubling questions of
governmental overreaching."' 171 She offers the example of a sex offender being
released in Hamilton, New Jersey, where residents might argue that having
information about the "offender in their neighborhood is a justified measure of
protection against the dangers of recidivism, believed to be high in the case of sex
crimes. ,,172 The contention of Hamilton's residents that they are entitled to this
information may be reasonable, Nissenbaum concedes, but "a similar argument
seems specious for a citizen of, say, Fairbanks, Alaska., 171 Professor Nissenbaum's
argument seems to be that the sex offender may have a privacy interest in his
criminal record in the context of Fairbanks, Alaska, where he does not arguably
pose a threat, even though it is public record in Hamilton, New Jersey. Whether he
does in fact have a privacy interest will depend, in Nissenbaum's view, on whether
norms relating to these contexts are violated. She offers this overview:
There are numerous possible sources of contextual norms,
including history, culture, law, convention, etc. Among the norms
present in most contexts are ones that govern information, and,
most relevant to our discussion, information about the people
involved in the contexts. I posit two types of informational norms:
norms of appropriateness, and norms of flow or distribution.
Contextual integrity is maintained when both types of norms are
174
upheld, and it is violated when either of the norms is violated.
In this way, Professor Nissenbaum seems to come full circle to the Supreme Court's
search and seizure cases, particularly Kyllo v. United States17 and Florida v.
Riley, 76 where the Court found that the subject's reasonable expectation of privacy

169. Id.at 130 31.
170. Id. at 1131. She further writes:
In insisting that privacy interests in garbage are a function not of content or
constitution, but of location whether inside or outside what is considered a
person's private sphere courts are, in effect, finding that [the third principle] is
relevant to these cases, but not [the second principle]; they are not finding
contents of garbage to be inherently sensitive or private information.
Id.
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determines whether government surveillance or inspection violates the Constitution.
The Court recognized that new technologies will be unexpected at first, and their
use deemed intrusive and unconstitutional. 7 As they become more mainstream
among the public, however, governmental use of them may not be deemed
unconstitutional. 178
In the public record context, it is difficult to understand how the subject of a
government record enjoys any reasonable expectation of privacy; that is to say, how
can the subject conclude that any contextual norm supports a claim to privacy
relating to the contents of the public record? On the other hand, it is easy to see how
a consumer in a commercial situation might freely share a piece of information in
one context that she would consider confidential in another. For example, a
consumer might willingly give her Social Security Number to a new cell phone
company to allow for credit verification but refuse to share the number over the
phone in a call initiated by someone claiming to be a credit card company.
The problem with Nissenbaum's approach is its complexity. She says:
A central tenet of contextual integrity is that there are no arenas
of life not governed by norms of informationflow, no information
or spheres of life for which "anything goes." Almost
everything-things that we do, events that occur, transactions that
take place happens in a context not only of place but of politics,
convention, and cultural expectation. These contexts can be as
sweepingly defined as, say, spheres of life such as education,
politics, and the marketplace or as finely drawn as the
conventional routines of visiting the
dentist, attending a family
17
wedding, or interviewing for a job. 9
Public policy relating to public records can address the broader brush strokes of the
normative picture. For example, private information can and should be redacted
from certain public records, other data should be abstracted to prevent identification
of individual subjects, and, in some cases, the government should simply not collect
information it does not need. Such decisions can be made on the basis of society's
norms and expectations. But the use of individual records in such a way as to
conform to individual or small-group norms is much more complicated. It would
be impractical, for example, to permit the subject of private information in a public
record to attach a personal list of conditions to ensure that use of the record would
not exceed her expectations, even if her wishes fit into the range of norms accepted
within the society.
Lastly, Nissenbaum criticizes the free flow of public records on the Internet:
[P]lacing the myriad categories of public records online would

177. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
178. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 51.
179. Nissenbaum. supra note 12. at 137.
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greatly facilitate the aggregation and analysis of these records by
third parties. This radical alteration of availability and flow does
little to address the original basis for creation of public records,
namely, public accountability of governmental agencies. 8 °
This view, however, fails to acknowledge the extent to which aggregation and
analysis may be the only way to ensure public accountability, considering the huge
number of transactions in which the government engages and the lack of
alternatives for reviewing its conduct.181
There are those who fear that accurate aggregated information about consumers
will give commercial interests too much power. For example, if insurers could
accurately bring together transactional information about insured parties, they could
price their products more accurately and charge less to those engaged in statistically
safer activities. But as one commentator notes, "A significant minority would lose
out, though, because they could no longer hide their drinking, smoking, and
18 2
skydiving to impose the costs of their lifestyle on the broader insurance pool.'
If accurate information in the hands of insurers leads to better insurance rates for
low risks, then it will probably lead to higher insurance rates for high risks. This
may raise policy concerns on a number of fronts. If health insurers "skim the
cream" off the purchasing population, offering the very healthy very low rates,
insurers will necessarily have to charge higher rates for the rest of the purchasing
population. Assuming that the poor tend to have worse health from the start, this
would be a negative feedback loop.
The availability of accurate information is not the problem in the health
insurance scenario above, however, the problem is the health policy. Assuming the
government addresses the problem by putting healthy and less healthy individuals
together in pools for the insurers to cover at the same premium, the insurers will
still require accurate information about their likely customers to determine what
premium to charge them all. Where public policy does not intervene, however, it
is hard to imagine why commercial interests should not use information that is as
complete and accurate as possible in making business decisions and in structuring
the services and products they offer to consumers.
This part has offered some observations about why public records access is
important, how such records are used, the value those uses bring to society, the
limitations imposed on the uses, and the rationales for those limitations. The
"database problem,"' 183 however, cannot be assessed without considering the extent
to which public records access and use may be protected as speech under the First
Amendment and whether the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine may
influence treatment of public records access.

180. Id. at 152.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
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IV. PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

From its earliest considerations of the appropriate place for speech of a
commercial nature in the hierarchy of First Amendment protections, the Supreme
Court has been loathe to provide such speech more than a grudging second-class
place. The Court has consistently adopted the view that speech soliciting a
commercial transaction does not deserve full First Amendment protection (and
according to some Justices, it deserves no First Amendment protection at all). The
language with which the Court describes the speech of commercial solicitations is
often derogatory. Further, the Court's analyses ofregulations that affect commercial
speech are tangled and confusing, giving no clear direction on what regulations will
pass constitutional muster.
The Supreme Court's early approaches to commercial speech include two
cases, Valentine v. Chrestensen'84 and Breardv. Alexandria,' which illustrate the
genesis of its views. The Court's first ruling in this area was not promising for
speech soliciting commercial transactions. In Valentine, the Court unanimously
supported a city code that "'prevent[ed] the lawful distribution of... commercial
and business advertising matter.""" Inoverturning the Second Circuit's judgment
for the plaintiff advertiser Chrestensen, the Court stated that "the Constitution
imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising."' 87
Chrestensen owned a submarine, which he moored at a state-owned pier in
New York, and he printed handbills to advertise showings of the submarine for
profit.'88 When Chrestensen distributed the handbills, he ran afoul of a New York
City sanitary code that prohibited commercial handbills but would not have
' ' 89
prohibited handbills containing only "'information or a public protest. Chrestensen subsequently printed and distributed a new handbill with similar
advertising on one side and on the other a protest against New York City's City
Dock Department for refusing him wharfage for his submarine.' 9° When the city
restrained him from distributing the handbills, he filed suit. Addressing the addition
of the political speech on the reverse of the flier, Justice Owen Roberts noted that
there was no need to engage in "nice appraisal based upon subtle distinctions," as
it was apparent that Chrestensen had added the political protest to his handbill
merely to avoid the code's prohibition.' 9'
In 1951, the Court in Breard upheld by a 6-3 vote a municipal ordinance
prohibiting peddlers or canvassers from visiting private residences without
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invitation."' The Court addressed commercial speech concerns by balancing a
homeowner's privacy rights against the right of a publisher to distribute published
works. 19 3 Justice Stanley Reed wrote for the majority. He outlined the issue as "a
balancing of the conveniences between some householders' desire for privacy and
the publisher's right to distribute publications in the precise way that those
soliciting for him think brings the best results."' 4 He noted that the fact that
periodicals were sold did not put them outside the protection of the First
Amendment, but that since the prohibition on door-to-door sales left other avenues
open for subscription sales, it would be "a misuse of the great guarantees of free
speech and free press to use those guarantees to force a community to admit the
solicitors of publications to the home premises of its residents."' 95 Thus Justice
Reed found the appropriate balance to be more favorable to residents' privacy and
against the interests of commercial speech.
Justice Hugo Black, writing in dissent and joined by Justice William Douglas,
considered this case to be a return to a judicial philosophy that did not give
preferred status to First Amendment freedoms.' Justice Black believed that the
First Amendment protects periodical solicitors when they are not actively
prohibited by a resident: "But when the homeowner himself has not [forbidden
solicitors], I believe that the First Amendment, interpreted with due regard for the
freedoms it guarantees, bars laws like the present ordinance which punish persons
who peacefully go from door to door as agents of the press."' 9 7 In a footnote,
however, Black differentiated those who sell media products from other
salespersons: "Of course I believe that the present ordinance could constitutionally
be applied to a 'merchant' who goes from door to door 'sellingpots.""98 Thus, for
Justice Black, speech associated with selling magazine subscriptions a media

192. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951).
193. Id. at 644. The court considered other arguments. For example. the ordinance as applied to
Jack H. Breard, a periodical subscription door-to-door salesperson, was held not to be an abridgment
of due process. Id.at 632 33. Breard argued "that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not permit a state or its subdivisions to deprive a specialist in door-to-door selling of
his means of livelihood." Id. But the Court held "that even a legitimate occupation may be restricted
or prohibited in the public interest." Id.The Court also addressed the Commerce Clause by addressing
"the importance to publishers of our many periodicals of the house-to-house method of selling by
solicitation. As a matter of constitutional law, however, they in their business operations are in no
different position so far as the Commerce Clause is concerned than the sellers of other wares." Id. at
637.
194. d.at 644.
195. Id.at 645.
196. Id. at 650 (Black. J.. dissenting). Although Justice Black does not reference this case, it is
reasonable to believe that he is referring to the famous Carolene Products "Footnote Four," which
provides additional protections to speech: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
197. Breard,341 U.S. at 650 (Black, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 650 n.*. (emphasis added).
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product with separate speech protections was protected under the First
Amendment, while a solicitation to enter into a purely commercial transaction
would not be protected.
Breard,decided in 1951, left purely commercial speech with no protections.
It did so without acknowledging the necessity toj ustify that position. 99 The Court's
1970s cases departed from this view, putting commercial speech on a stronger
footing, but leaving it far behind other forms of protected speech. These cases
started with what might seem like a setback.
In 1973 in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,2 ° ° the Court upheld a regulation that forbade sex discrimination in
classified advertisements. 20 1 Justice Lewis Powell, writing for a 5-4 Court, focused
less on the editorial discretion newspapers have in placing classified advertisements
and more on the advertisements themselves. He wrote: "Discrimination in
employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity under
the Ordinance. We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be
forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitutes. 20 2 Thus, the Court found that Pittsburgh Press had violated the section
of Pittsburgh's Human Relations Ordinance that forbade newspapers from carrying
help-wanted ads in sex-designated columns (e.g., "Help Wanted-Male" and "Help
Wanted Female") as illegally aiding the employers' sex discrimination. °3
Justice Potter Stewart saw grave implications in the Court's holding. In a
dissent joined in large part by Justice Harry Blackmun and in full by Justice
Douglas, Justice Stewart envisioned a slippery slope of censorial governmental
behavior:
The Court today holds that a government agency can force a
newspaper publisher to print his classified advertising pages in a
certain way in order to carry out governmental policy. After this
decision, I see no reason why government cannot force a
newspaper publisher to conform in the same way in order to
achieve other goals thought socially desirable. And ifgovernment
can dictate the layout of a newspaper's classified advertising
pages today, what is there to prevent
it from dictating the layout
20 4
of the news pages tomorrow?
Chief Justice Warren Burger also dissented from what he saw as an expansion of
the commercial speech doctrine, noting that the newspaper's additional "Notice to
Job Seekers," which pointed out that the sex-based classifications were for the
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readers' convenience only and that employers could not engage in sex-based
discrimination, was sufficient to eliminate any complicity in aiding employer
discrimination. °5
Two years later, however, the Court found protected content in commercial
solicitations, thus justifying First Amendment protection for some commercial
speech. In Bigelow v. Virginia,2°6 a case that followed the politically volatile
abortion decisions in Roe v. Wade21' and Doe v. Bolton,2°8 a 7-2 Court upheld a
Virginia newspaper's right to carry an advertisement for abortion services available
in New York City but illegal in Virginia at the time of the advertisement.2 9 The
Virginia Weekly, a newspaper published in Charlottesville and circulated at the
University of Virginia campus, carried such an advertisement in 1971, and its
publisher, Jeffrey C. Bigelow, was convicted of violating a Virginia statute that
forbade any kind of advertisement
to "'encourage or prompt the procuring of
210
abortion or miscarriage.'
During Bigelow's appeal, the Court decided Roe and Doe; consequently,
Bigelow's conviction was vacated and the case remanded for reconsideration by the
Virginia Supreme Court.2 ' That court affirmed the conviction, noting that neither
Roe nor Doe mentioned abortion advertising and that Bigelow's case was not about
abortion rights but rather about First Amendment issues.212 The Court's decision,
written by Justice Blackmun, focused on the content of the advertisement; the Court
held it was more than just a mere commercial solicitation.
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed
information of potential interest and value to a diverse
audience not only to readers possibly in need of the services
offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or
genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State
and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.213
The advertisement was not deceptive or fraudulent; it did not advertise something
illegal in New York, further criminal
activity in Virginia, or force itself upon
214
captive or unwilling audiences. In addition, "[t]he strength of appellant's interest
was augmented by the fact that the statute was applied against him as publisher and
editor of a newspaper, not against the advertiser or a referral agency or a

205. Id. at 393-94 (Burger. C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also did not see a "blatant
involvement by a newspaper in a criminal transaction." Id. at 395 n.2.
206. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
207. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
208. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
209. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812 13, 829.
210. ld. at811 13.
211. Id. at 815.
212. Id. (quoting Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 200 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1973)).
213. Id. at 822.
214. Id. at 828 (citing Breard v. Alexandria 341 U.S. 622, 644 (1951); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105. 110 (1932)).
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practitioner. The prosecution thus incurred more serious First Amendment
overtones. 215
In dissent, Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justice Byron White, thought
that the Court should not take the content of the advertisement into consideration
but instead should merely consider the fact that the content was itself an
advertisement-that is, a solicitation for purchase of services-and thus, subject to
regulation.2 16 Further, he claimed, the Court has "consistently recognized that
irrespective of a State's power to regulate extraterritorial commercial transactions
in which its citizens participate it retains an independent power to regulate the
business of commercial solicitation and advertising within its borders. 21 He
quoted the Virginia Supreme Court:
It is clearly within the police power of the state to enact
reasonable measures to ensure that pregnant women in Virginia
who decide to have abortions come to their decisions without the
commercial advertising pressure usually incidental to the sale of
a box of soap powder. And the state is rightfully interested in
seeing that Virginia women who do decide to have abortions
obtain proper medical care and do not fall into the hands of those
interested only in financial gain, and not in the welfare of the
patient. 218
Thus, to Rehnquist, this was an issue of a state's power to determine what goes on
inside that state, including commercial transactions and advertising.
In 1976, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 2 19 demonstrated the Court's continuing struggle with commercial
speech containing other elements. This case advanced the most protection for
commercial speech by the Court to date. The plaintiffs challenged a Virginia statute
that held a pharmacist guilty of unprofessional conduct if she "'publishes,
advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any
amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms ... for any drugs
which may be dispensed only by prescription.' 22' The plaintiffs alleged that this
statute 1violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Court agreed in a 7-1
22

vote.

Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, first asked whether speech falls

215. Id.This is an early example of the Court adopting an approach that looks not at the speech
but the speaker when evaluating speech in the commercial context.
216. Id.at 831 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
217. 1d.at 835.
218. Id. at 832-33 (emphasis added) (quoting Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176

(1972)).
219. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
220. Id.at 749 50.
221. Id.at 749, 770.
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outside First Amendment protection "because money is spent to project it. ' 2 22 He
affirmed that it does not.223 Blackmun next considered the major concern expressed
by the Board of Pharmacy that professional pharmacists might be put out of
business by low-cost, low-quality pharmacists, and suggested that rather than
legislating against truthful commercial speech, the alternative would be to permit
information to be publicly available and let the consumer do the research. 4 Justice
Blackmun recognized that non-truthful commercial speech would still be
unprotected, and he expressed no fears that reasonable regulation would harm
advertising or cause it to cease: "Since advertising is the sine qua non of
commercial profits, there
is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation
225
and forgone entirely.,
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, forecast a time when advertisements of
prescription drugs would include not only their prices but "active promotion" of
their consumption. 226 He added a withering assessment of the Court's rationale for
its decision:
The Court insists that the rule it lays down is consistent even with
the view that the First Amendment is "primarily an instrument to
enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy." I had
understood this view to relate to public decisionmaking as to
political, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision

222. Id. at 761.
223. Id. at 762.
Our question is whether speech which does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction," PittsburghPressCo. v. Human Relations Comm 'n, 413
U.S., at 385, is so removed from any "exposition of ideas," Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), and from "'truth, science, morality, and
arts in general. in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government,"' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), that it lacks all
protection. Our answer is that it is not.
Id.
224. Id. at 770.
The alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that
people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them. If they are truly open. nothing prevents
the "professional" pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior
product, and contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescription
drug retailer. But the choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to
make or the Virginia General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice.
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if
it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.
Id.
225. Id. at 772 n.24.
226. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting). One might today grant that Justice Rehnquist was
prescient when ads for sexual enhancement drugs, restless leg syndrome medications, and remedies for
many other maladies permeate our television viewing most of the time with no discussion of their
costs.
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of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another
kind of shampoo. It is undoubtedly arguable that many people in
the country regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as
who may be elected to local, state, or national political office, but
that does not automatically bring information about competing
shampoos within the protection of the First Amendment."'
The condescension and disdain evident here is typical of Rehnquist's response to
commercial speech. He generally has trivialized commercial speech by using the
rhetorical tool of identifying it with its least common denominator-the low-cost
household product. It is nevertheless unclear why Rehnquist's opinion of what is
important should bear more weight than what "many people in the country" believe.
In 1980, the Court decided Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York,228 which has emerged as the Court's major test
for commercial speech regulation. At issue in CentralHudson was an order by the
Public Service Commission banning all advertising by electrical utilities promoting
the use of electricity during a fuel shortage.22 9 Justice Powell, writing for an 8-1
majority, provided no ringing endorsement of commercial speech. Rather, he
limited its protection: "The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The
protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both
of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation. 23 °
Having noted the secondary status of commercial speech, Powell provided a
four-part test by which regulations on commercial speech would be evaluated:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least [1] must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.23'
Justice Powell's evaluation of the Public Service Commission's order under this
test resulted in its invalidation. There was no debate that Central Hudson's
commercial speech was about a lawful activity and was accurate, and the fact that
Central Hudson held a monopoly over electricity sales in its service area did not

227. Id. at 787 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

228. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
229. Id.at 558 59.
230. Id.at 562-63 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 57 (1978)).
231. Id. at 566.
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mean that the speech at issue was not commercial in nature.232 The Court
considered the state's interest in reducing electricity consumption to be substantial,
and a ban on advertising electricity was directly connected to a decrease in
consumption. 233 The Court, however, found that the Commission failed to
demonstrate that a less restrictive approach than a complete ban on the advertising
in question would not have advanced its interest in reducing electrical
consumption.234
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist first indicated that he did not agree that the
speech of a state-created monopoly should be entitled to First Amendment
protection. 21 'He added that the Commission's order should correctly be considered
an economic, rather than a speech regulation, and thus the speech, if it had First
Amendment value at all, should be subordinate in value. 236 Finally, he disagreed
with the "no more extensive than necessary" part of the majority's four-part test,
finding it unduly restrictive on the states' abilities to promote their interests.23
Justice Rehnquist again took a shot at commercial speakers:
Nor do I think those who won our independence, while declining
to "exalt order at the cost of liberty," would have viewed a
merchant's unfettered freedom to advertise in hawking his wares
as a "liberty" not subject to extensive regulation in light of the
government's substantial interest in attaining "order" in the
economic sphere.238
Not all members of the current Court believe that protection for commercial
speech should be different from that given to other truthful speech. For example,
the most outspoken advocate of increased protection for commercial speech, Justice
Clarence Thomas, argued in his concurrence in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island2 39 that regulations prohibiting individuals from receiving truthful information
about lawful products should be unconstitutional. 24" At issue were two Rhode Island
laws: one that prohibited the advertising of alcoholic products by sellers except at
the point-of-sale and one that prohibited advertising of alcohol in the mass media
with any reference to price. 2 4 ' The Court applied the CentralHudson test and found
that the laws did not advance the state's interest in reducing alcohol
consumption,
24 2
nor were they the least restrictive means of attempting to do S0.

232. Id.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 568 69.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 584 85.
Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 489 90 (majority opinion).
Id. at 507 (plurality opinion).
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Thomas concurred with the outcome in 44 Liquormart,but he further asserted
that "all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant are
impermissible.1 24 3 Further, he suggested that government should have no interest
(the second part of the Central Hudson test) in restricting individuals from
obtaining truthful information.244 He would also eliminate the division between
commercial and noncommercial speech and return to the more generous stance of
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy:
Although the Court took a sudden turn away from VirginiaBd. of
Pharmacy in Central Hudson, it has never explained why
manipulating the choices of consumers by keeping them ignorant
is more legitimate when the ignorance is maintained through
suppression of "commercial" speech than when the same
ignorance is maintained through suppression of "noncommercial"
speech.... Rather than continuing to apply a test that makes no
sense to me when the asserted state interest is of the type involved
here, I would return to the reasoning and holding of VirginiaBd.
245
of Pharmacy.
Thomas has repeated this view in several other cases where he was often the lone
voice advocating additional commercial speech protections.246
The Court has interpreted the Central Hudson test more strictly in recent
cases-particularly the last two elements, which address the advancement of the
government's interest and the breadth of the regulation.24 Of particular note is
GreaterNew Orleans BroadcastingAss 'n v. United States,248 decided in 1999, in
which the Court overturned a federal law restricting broadcast advertising for
private casinos.24 9 The broadcasters wanted to advertise in Louisiana and
Mississippi, where such gambling was legal.25
In overturning the federal statute's application in GreaterNew Orleans, the
Court distinguished this case from its earlier decision in United States v. Edge

243. Id. at 526 (Thomas. J.. concurring).
244. See id. at 518.
245. Id. at 526, 528.
246. See Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost: Individualism,
Collectivism andConflict in CommercialSpeech Doctrine,9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 237. 260-61.264-71
(2004) (fully discussing Justice Thomas's perspective on the application of the Central Hudson test).
247. See id. at 264 68.
248. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
249. Id. at 176. The statute provided in relevant part:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a
license is required by any law of the United States ... any advertisement of or
information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering
prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance.., shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1304.
250. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 180.
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BroadcastingCo.,2 5 ' where the Court upheld the same federal statute as applied to
advertising for gambling in Virginia broadcast from a North Carolina station, where
gambling was illegal.252 In GreaterNew Orleans,Justice John Paul Stevens applied
the CentralHudson test and found that the regulation applied in this case failed the
third and fourth parts. Because the government was targeting only particular types
of casino gambling for regulation in only one medium (broadcasting) while
ignoring other forms of gambling and gambling advertising, 2 3 the regulation at
issue could not legitimately advance the government's interest in reducing the
social costs of gambling and supporting states that restrict gambling.254
Moreover, Stevens added, the regulation "is so pierced by exemptions and
inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.",255 In other words,
Stevens believed that a law that permitted so much other gambling-related
commercial speech to take place could not reasonably be believed to advance the
government's stated interest in curbing gambling activities. Thomas concurred in
the judgment and reiterated his position that CentralHudson should not be applied
in cases such as GreaterNew Orleanswhere the government's stated interest is "to
keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices
'
in the marketplace."256
25 7
In GreaterNew Orleans, the Court seems to be looking for some coherence
in the regulatory regimes the government advances for commercial speech.258
However, overall, the Court's majority opinions have never proffered a rationale
or clear test for how to draw a line between commercial speech and noncommercial
speech.259 In the absence of such a test, the differential protection offered

251. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
252. Id. at 423. The Court was unwilling to "erode" the policy of supporting North Carolina's
gambling ban. Id. at 435.
253. GreaterNew Orleans, 527 U.S. at 191.
254. Id. at 188-90.
255. Id. at 190.
256. Id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,517 U.S.
484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
257. Id. at 195 ("Had the Federal Government adopted a more coherent policy, or accommodated
the rights of speakers in States that have legalized the underlying conduct, this might be a different
case." (citation omitted)).
258. The Department of.Justice used GreaterNew Orleans as its justification to stop enforcement
of 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). a similar statute barring the mailing oftruthful advertisements about lawful
gambling:
As reflected in the text of the respective statutes, § 1302 imposes restrictions on
mailed communications regarding gambling or lottery matter that are nearly
identical to those imposed by § 1304 with respect to broadcast communications
on the same subject matter. Further. § 1302 is subject to the same weakening
exceptions that the Supreme Court considered fatal to § 1304's constitutionality
in GreaterNew Orleans.
Letter from Janet Reno. U.S. Attorney Gen. to Speaker of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives (Sept. 25.
2000). availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc1302.htm.
259. The press is, of course, also a business. See Associated Press v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board,
301 U.S. 103, 128 (1937) (noting that the Associated Press is "an instrumentality set up by constituent
members who are engaged in a commercial business for profit.")

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 935

commercial and noncommercial speech is difficult to explain. Members of the
Court who support greater government regulation of commercial speech instead
resort to describing it in terms that minimize its importance: commercial speakers
are "hawking" "soap," "shampoo," and "pots. ' 260 These rhetorical characterizations
assume, but do not really argue, that commercial solicitations do not have a place
in the public discourse.
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL

A.

Analysis

There is no question that aggregated public records will play a critical role in
the future of American political discourse, as they have in the recent past. For
example, Professor Solove cites the 2000 United States presidential election and the
voter registration debacle in Florida in support of claims that commercial access to
aggregated public records creates dangers. 26 1 He recounts the tale of how a state
contractor, a subsidiary of data aggregator ChoicePoint, provided Florida election
officials with an erroneous list of 8,000 people who should be removed from the
voter registration rolls as a consequence of being convicted felons. 26 2 Most of the
8,000 had actually only been convicted of misdemeanors and should have been
allowed to vote. 26 3 The error was corrected, but some eligible voters may not have
been allowed to vote.264 ChoicePoint is a data broker, one of the entities Solove
warns is making public records collection dangerous.265 The author of the article
Professor Solove cited, Greg Palast, a liberal journalist and critic of the Bush
administration, went on to write The Best Democracy Money Can Buy, in which he
claimed that as many as 57,000 voters were excluded from voting due to
ChoicePoint's mistakes.266 This would have served as excellent additional support
for Solove's position but for one fact: Palast made extensive use of the voter
exclusion database of the Florida Secretary of State to analyze the problem because
he was able to obtain it in aggregated electronic form. Palast quips, "Ihave a copy
of it: two silvery CD-ROM disks right out of the office computers of Florida
Secretary of State Katherine Harris. Once decoded
and flowed into a database, they
26 7
make for interesting, if chilling, reading.
The secretary of state's database included names, dates of birth, races, and
genders of Florida voters and the felons with whom they had been matched,268

260. See supra text accompanying notes 197, 217, 226, 237.
261. Solove, supra note 10, at 1151-52.
262. Id.at1152.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id.at1151.
266. GREG PALAST, THE BEST DEMOCRACY MONEY CAN BuY 44, 51 (expanded election ed.
2004).
267. Id.at11.
268. Id.at55.

2007]

COMMERCIAL USE OF AGGREGATED PUBLIC RECORDS

which is all personal information as defined in this Article .26 9 The database proved
indispensable in Palast's effort to develop an explanation for the behavior of
ChoicePoint and Secretary of State Harris. 27 0 Whether one regards Palast as a
crusader for justice in voting or a crank journalist trying to advance his own
interests, there is no denying that access to public records advanced the discussion.
One can easily envision uses of public records that develop their full public
benefit only in the commercial context. For example, a consulting business forms
to assist citizens in abating their property taxes; it performs detailed statistical
analyses on property tax records to demonstrate disparities to the tax adjustment
committee on citizens' behalf.27' For any one consumer to acquire the computer
hardware, software, and expertise necessary to perform such an analysis on her own
would undoubtedly cost more than the consumer stands to benefit in reduced
property tax bills. In fact, this consulting firm would be able to assist taxpayers only
to the extent that it is able to use aggregated records for its commercial enterprise
and probably only if it can use those same public records to determine which
taxpayers are most likely to benefit from its services.
This leads to discussion of a common restriction on public records: prohibitions
against soliciting business from those named in the records. Imagine a law firm that
has developed particularly effective techniques for exposing inaccurately calibrated
alcohol breathalyzer devices sends letters to persons arrested for drunk driving,
inviting them to consider the firm's defense services. This example can be repeated
in any of a thousand different ways. For example, consider the real estate valuation
company that identifies potential clients by noting properties involved in pending
eminent domain condemnation proceedings; the company has considerable success
in getting better prices for property owners. In each case where a person identified
in a public record is a person who might be in need of a service, particularly a
service to assist the person in interests adverse to the government, it is, of course,
in the government's interest to prevent experts from marketing their services to
those persons. Keeping citizens from resources they need to vindicate their rights
against government efforts, however, is not a substantial government interest under
CentralHudson or any other imaginable First Amendment test.
1.

The Objective of Public Records Use As a Focus of Inquiry

The central issue in a First Amendment speech analysis of public records use
is not in the use itself, but in the objectives of the use. Whether the use is research,
operations, redistribution, or solicitation, the objectives of the requester will play
a central role in performing the First Amendment speech analysis. 27 2 Ifthe requester

269. See supra text accompanying note 75.
270. Id. at 44 45. Palast uses the database to support his conclusion that Secretary of State Harris
singled out black voters, who are more likely to be Democrats, for exclusion from the voter registration
rolls. See id. at 59-61.
271. See Prop. Tax Reduction Consultants Inc. v. Township of Islip, 799 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 78
(App. Div. 2005).
272. See supra Part ll.B.
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will use the public records to support media reporting of matters of public interest,
political organizing, or commentary on the government's business or on public
officials, the speech involved, and the public records use that leads to it, deserves
the greatest quantum of First Amendment speech protection. If the requester will
use the records to solicit commercial transactions, the speech involved, and the
public records use that leads to it, deserves at least the protection the Supreme
Court has accorded commercial speech. In some cases, however, the right to solicit
based upon public records rises to a higher level of importance and deserves full
First Amendment protection. Even when the requester's objective is commercial
redistribution of the public records to third parties who will use it to make decisions
about the subjects of the records, the use is entitled to be treated as at least as
valuable as commercial speech. If and only if the requester intends to use the public
records for its own internal operational use would no speech act be subject to any
degree of protection under the First Amendment.
The process from the government's compilation of public records to the final
objectives of a data requester constitute an information flow, the necessary steps of
which are access to the records, development or analysis of the records, and use of
the records to achieve certain objectives. In the case of a speech objective, the flow
might be described as "access, analysis, and advocacy." The entire information flow
should be subject to First Amendment protection, provided and to the extent that
the objective of the public record use is subject to First Amendment protection.
Restrictions on the use of public records data imposed at the source (for example,
by the government agency) pose serious First Amendment problems, as there is
little or no way of knowing the objectives of the use. The analysis here starts with
the beginning and the end of the information flow and concludes with the middle.
At the outset, there is no reason to view access to public records as a speech act
by the requester. The available data and the means for obtaining them will be
prescribed by statute or rule. The requester's act of requesting the records requires
communication to the government, but this communication is not akin to petitions
for redress and other forms of political speech.2 73 What is more, no government
restricts the nature or content of a request for access to public records-that is to
say, there is no penalty for making the request for public records. Thus, though
there is a constitutional dimension to public record access, that dimension does not
arise from its nature as a speech act.
The objective of public records access means the objective that the requester
(or someone down the line from the requester) intends for access, whether it be
speech, academic research, or conduct of commerce. As discussed earlier,274 the
objectives of public records access vary widely-and thus so should the degree of
First Amendment protection accorded to them. In the examples that follow, assume
that the underlying government records were obtained legally and that any

273. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (discussing the great importance of First
Amendment protection for political expression, such as discussing public issues and debating
candidates).
274. See supra Part ll.B.
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publication regarding them is factually correct. The First Amendment allows for
remedies where speech purporting to be factual is false or misleading2 75 and where
information is obtained illegally. 276 A few examples may be helpful.
First, a reporter seeks access to public records relating to accidents on interstate
highway 405 in California with the objective to write a newspaper article. The
objective of the reporter is speech on a matter of public interest-highway
safety-which is a form of speech accorded the highest protection under the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court has already held that the press may not be
prohibited from publishing government data (even data that is not a public record
by the definition established in this Article)
so long as the data came into the
277
possession of the press by legal means.

Second, a political party obtains voter registration records; its objective is
speech to solicit political contributions. Soliciting political contributions is
protected under the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court has said government
may regulate it "only with narrow specificity. ' 278 If the government adopted a law
that outlawed solicitation of political contributions by all means, the law would
likely be unconstitutional. If the government adopted a law that prohibited any
solicitation for any purpose in the form of a phone call to a person who has placed
her name on the Do-Not-Call list, it would fare much better with the First
Amendment. 27 ' The Do-Not-Call system is content neutral; it regulates only the
time, place, and manner of speech, and it leaves open ample other avenues of
communication.280 Certain other types of solicitations based upon public records are
similar. For example, the attorney discussed above who was very skilled in
defending drunk driving cases may wish to send solicitations offering to represent
persons recently arrested for drunk driving. Because this is a solicitation regarding
the subject's relations with the government and the attorney is proposing to play the
constitutionally protected role of legal counsel,28 1the attorney's speech in this case
probably warrants stronger protection than the commercial speech standard. Indeed,
it warrants the highest protection under the First Amendment.
Of course, not every requester of public records has a speech objective. The
character or nature of the requester alone does not indicate whether the requester's
objective will be a speech act. So, for the third example, consider the academic

275. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 80 (1964) (establishing the actual malice
standard as publication of information "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not").
276. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991) (discussing why the media
company should be punished for obtaining information by illegal means).
277. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (invalidating a West Virginia
statute prohibiting newspapers from publishing lawfully acquired truthful information identifying a
youth charged as a juvenile offender by name).
278. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,620 (1976) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963)) (striking down a local ordinance that required solicitors of political contributions to
register with local officials).
279. See infra text accompanying notes 332-46.
280. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004).
281. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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researcher who obtains public records with the objective of analyzing them and
including the results in a paper or book. The objective of her use of public records
is a speech act, the paper or book on an academic topic, normally accorded high
protection under the Constitution. If the researcher obtains the public records to
identify likely purchasers and solicit them to purchase the book, the objective is still
a speech act, but it may be deemed of lower social value as commercial speech and
subject to greater government regulation. If the researcher obtains the public
records to perform research, the results of which she intends to use solely to
improve the operations of her lab, no speech act is implicated.
Fourth, consider a consumer reporting agency or credit bureau, which gathers
public record information with the objective of selling reports to prospective
employers regarding the backgrounds of prospective employees. The reporting
agency is motivated purely by profit. It will redistribute the public records
information it obtains after correlating it with other data. Its sole speech act will be
the communication to its customer of the report about the prospective employee,
and the employer will not use it for a speech act at all. This speech on private
matters would not likely be accorded full protection under current First Amendment
jurisprudence.2 82 But, it is nevertheless accorded some protection. 283
Finally, consider the case where the requester's only objective is to make
operational use of the public records; that, by itself, will not constitute a speech act.
For example, the title company that gathers public records regarding real estate
sales, liens, mortgages, and so forth, solely to make determinations about
underwriting title insurance is using public records data for operations. The
company never discloses the contents of the public records themselves. There is no
reason to view this operational use of public records by itself as a speech act.
The means link the beginning and end of the information flow. The problem
with current formulations of restrictions on public record access or use is that they
impose limitations on the requester without regard to what speech objectives, if
any, the requester has or whether the requester is the end-user of the records. The
means can be regulated to the extent the ends can be regulated, but the beginnings
should not be regulated. In a simple example, consider the news reporter above;
assume she has hired an outside statistician from a company that exists solely to
perform analysis for profit to analyze a vast collection of public records. Her
objective is a newspaper story. Should it matter whether the reporter requests the
public records or whether her contractor statistician does? Under the FOIA the
government would charge a higher fee to collect and copy the records depending
on whether the commercial entity or the media operative was the requester. 284 It is
difficult to see the government's interest in charging more in one case than another
when the outcome is the same. Similarly, some jurisdictions prohibit, or attempt to
prohibit, aggregation and redistribution of public records once the requester has

282. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.. 472 U.S. 749. 760 (1985) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983)).
283. Id.
284. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(ii)(1)-(11) (2000).
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received them.285 In the reporter example, if the reporter requests the records, she
may not be able to redistribute them to her contractor. If the contractor requests the
records, it might be able to provide analysis of records to the reporter, but not the
underlying records. Again, what interest does the agency advance by preventing
circulation of public records in the course of preparing the records for use in
protected speech? None.
Thus, if the record is public and the user's objective and use are otherwise
lawful, governments should not withhold records or attempt to put additional
conditions on their use. Note that this Article does not address the extent to which
the government collects information, performs surveillance, or uses private data to
investigate citizens. Though they are important questions, they are not necessary
for the resolution of the matters raised in this Article.286
2.

Critics of Public RecordAccess Overstate the Problems

Graeme Newman and Ronald Clarke address the different values that can be
placed on information depending upon its intended use:
One could argue that tourist photographs of, say, the Eiffel Tower
have barely any monetary value. One can buy postcards of the
Eiffel Tower and its surroundings for just a few [pennies]. But
when one thinks of such photographs as providing information

285. See, e.g., Ramsey County Dep't of Prop. Records & Revenue, Ramsey County RRlnfo
SubscriberAgreement, availableat http://rrinfo.co.ramsey.mn.us/SubscribeDetails.asp (last visited June
11, 2007) (providing a license to access public record information). The license agreement places
substantial limitations on the requestor:
This software access license includes the right to view and print insubstantial
portions of data for the sole use of the Subscriber and does not grant the
Subscriber the right to store or download any of the County's data. The Subscriber
may not create additional copies of material printed from the County's database
and may not distribute materials gained from the County's database to third
parties without the prior written approval of the County.
Id.
286. Of course, we have views on some of these matters. We do not propose increased collection
of data by the government. Indeed, we argue that the government should collect less information in
certain circumstances. We do not argue for the greater government surveillance; we do not support the
forms of public surveillance by the government that have recently been much criticized. We do not
contend that the categories of personal information that are currently viewed as non-public, including
medical and financial information, should be diminished. Instead, we assume that personal information
will be available in public records only to the extent necessary to vindicate the public's interest in
overseeing the operation of government. We argue that care must be given to careful redaction and
abstraction of private information. And we do not argue that the government should have greater access
to private collections of personal information. We are interested in public records by definition, we
believe private records should be much more difficult for the government and the private sector to
obtain. To the extent the that government obtains private records, however, we believe they become part
of the public records and should be available for review in their redacted and abstracted form. Only in
this way can citizens be assured that the government is using personal information from private sources
in a way that is consistent with public policy.
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that could be used in planning an approach to blowing up the
Eiffel Tower, the value of those photographs changes
immediately. There may be little monetary value in such
information, but there may be considerable political and terrorist
value .... [T]he ownership of information certainly contributes
to its value, but so also does the intent of the criminal. 2" 7
The vast majority of folks who buy and take pictures of the Eiffel Tower are not
terrorists but tourists. Their purchases fuel a huge segment of the French economy.
In one year, more tourists arrived in France-75,121,000-than in any other
country in the world. 288 Tourism in France is a $40 billion industry. 289 Preventing
tourists from leaving Paris with pictures of the Eiffel Tower might decrease the risk
of a terrorist attack on the landmark, but the cost might not be worth the benefit.
Unfortunately, data aggregators in general appear to be an unsympathetic lot.
Jim Harper argues:
Data aggregators provide an essential service to a fully
modern, remote-commerce economy .... Far more often than
not, data aggregation helps worthy consumers gain access to
financial services, employment, and housing. Data aggregation
adds brainpower to our modern economy and makes it far more
efficient and responsive to consumer interests. But this worldview
is not dominant today, nor gaining in currency ....
... [Aggregators] remain essentially mysterious to the vast
majority of people obscure and shadowy handmaidens of
corporate marketers, financiers, and government investigators.
They collect information from sources of which most consumers
are unaware and use the information in ways that most consumers
don't understand. °
In short, the benefits of commercial data aggregation are largely invisible. They
most often appear in the form of smooth and fully authorized transactions, or in the
apprehension or location of persons avoiding their child support obligations or
seeking to secrete assets from creditors and the courts. The problems of commercial
data aggregation, on the other hand, make great grist for the media mill. Critics of
public records use may, however, be overstating the dangers. In particular, claims
that public record data will be used for identity theft or to single out consumers for
various kinds of discrimination are largely unattested.
The role of public records and the data brokers who deliver them in credit card

287.

GRAEME

R.
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&

RONALD V. CLARKE, SUPERHIGHWAY ROBBERY: PREVENTING E-

COMMERCE CRIME 48 (2003).
288. THE ECONOMIST POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 77 (2007).

289. Id.
290. HARPER, supra note 182, at 171 72.
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and identity theft cases is not great. In 2006, the New York Times, Washington Post,
Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribunetogether published exactly forty-six items
referring to identity theft or identity thieves in their headlines. 291 Of these, twentytwo did not report on any actual identity thefts. They included four stories about
data stolen from individual companies;112 six stories about new laws, task forces,
and services to deal with identity theft;... six items that were letters to the editor
and book reviews; 294 three (including two from different editions ofthe same paper)
discussing new identity theft statistics from the Department of Justice; 295 and three
discussing the scandal surrounding the loss of a Veterans Administration laptop
with more than 25 million veterans and service members identified in data on the
laptop.296 The Veterans Administration's laptop was later found and no identity
theft was traced to it.29 7 Of the stories that discussed actual identity thefts, one
related to data stolen from a university network that may have resulted in a case of
identity theft;298 two addressed stories of family members committing credit card
fraud against each other; 299 and eight were cases where the fraud resulted from the
theft of wallets, skimming of credit cards victims handed over in restaurants and
hotels, and telephone scams.3 °°
Ofthe remainder, only nine articles addressed situations where aggregated data
or the Internet were used to commit fraud.30 ' Of those nine, none implicated even
a single data broker or commercial data aggregator. Two stories could be read to

291. A search of the headlines of these four newspapers yielded these results by inputting the
following search terms into www.lexis.com: HEADLINE ("identity theft") or HEADLINE ("identity
thiev!") with the date range of January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006.
292. See, e.g., Boeing Laptop Stolen; 382,000 Risk Identity Theft, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2006,
Redeye ed. at 7 (reporting the theft of a laptop belonging to the Boeing Co. and containing the names
and Social Security numbers of thousands of employees and retirees).
293. See, e.g., Linda Saslow, Trash Law Is Meant to Deter Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2006, § 14LI, at I I (discussing a new town ordinance making it illegal to dig through someone else's
garbage).
294. See, e.g.. Alec Frank. Letter to the Editor. Shift the Burden on Identity Theft, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2006, at A20 (suggesting that the burden of keeping personal information safe should be on
the entities requiring the identifying information).
295. See, e.g.. Fewer Identity Theft Victims Are Cited in New U.S. Study, WASH. POST, Apr. 3,
2006, at A4 (reporting that three out of every 100 households in the United States has reported being
a victim of identity theft).
296. See, e.g., Christopher Lee & Steve Vogel, PersonalData on Veterans Is Stolen; Burglary
Leaves Millions at Risk ofIdentity Theft. WASH. POST, May 23, 2006, at A l (reporting on the theft of
an electronic data file containing large amounts of personal information).
297. Fred H. Cate, Editorial, The Identity Theft Scare, WASH. POST. Oct. 14, 2006. at A21.
298. Rebecca Trounson & Stuart Silverstein, Seeking to Allay Fears on Data Loss, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2006. at B1.
299. See, e.g., John Leland, Identity Thiefls Often Foundin FamilyPhoto, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13.
2006, at A l (reporting that of the identity theft victims who learn the identity of the thief, half the time
it is a family member or other close person).
300. See., e.g.. Patrick Kampert. Virtual GuardDog PatrolsDoorways to Identity Theft, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 12. 2006. § Q, at 1 (noting examples of hotel employees stealing personal information from
customers).
301. See, e.g., Guilty Plea in Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2006, at B4 (reporting on the
arrest of the leader of an Internet identity theft ring).
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imply that public records were being used in credit card fraud and identity theft. 3 °2
One of them reported an extraordinary situation in Scottsdale, Arizona, where the
county recorder acknowledged there were tens of millions of public records on the
county web site, and a suspect in police custody showed police that at least some
included Social Security and bank account numbers.30 3 The recorder claimed
it was
' 3 4
too late to redact the documents as they are already "'out there now. - 0
In a Washington Post editorial, Professor Fred H. Cate summarized the
situation, noting that security breaches are more commonly the result of accidental
loss of equipment than they are the result of"a deliberate attack on the data. '31 5The
identities of data thieves also make for interesting consideration. Cate discusses a
survey conducted by Javelin Strategy and Research:
Thirty-five percent of identity-theft cases in which the
perpetrator was identified involved a "family member or relative,"
and 18 percent a friend or neighbor. That means that roughly half
of all known identity thieves were not strangers. Another 23
percent of such cases involved dishonest employees. All together,
three-fourths of identity theft cases did not involve access to30 6the
kind of third-party data obtained through a security breach.
By citing these news stories, this Article does not intend to suggest that credit
card fraud and identity theft are not serious problems. Even Professor Cate
acknowledges that the Department of Justice reported approximately 538,700 cases
of true identity theft (cases where the thief uses personal information to open
accounts in the victim's name) in the second half of 2004.307 This Article intends
only to place the problem in perspective.
B. Proposal
If the ends of public records access are lawful and subject to high First
Amendment protections, then the means-the analysis, distribution, and
redistribution-of public record data to achieve those ends are subject to high First
Amendment protections. 38 By contrast, where there is little protected speech on the

302. See, e.g, John Leland & Tom Zeller, Jr., Technology and Easy CreditGive Identity Thieves
an Edge. N.Y. TIMES. May 30, 2006, at Al (discussing identity theft in Arizona, which has one of the
highest identity theft rates in the United States, and noting "[p]olice officers and prosecutors knew of
just two cases involving public records").
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Cate, supra note 297.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. As Justice White said in Cox Broadcasting:
Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the
administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting
of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the press to
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objective end of the information flow, the government may impose more regulation
on the means. In regulating public records use, regulation of the ends justifies
regulation of the means. If the information flow is imagined as a string with the
government records offices at one end and the ultimate use of data at the other, the
only regulation of what comes between them is regulation that is consistent with the
speech (or non-speech) nature of the objective at the far end of the string. This is
largely the state of affairs today, except with regard to the limitations some
governments impose on requesters at the beginning of the information
flow limitations that are unconstitutional in at least some cases.
For example, statutes that limit access to public records so that commercial
entities cannot receive them, so that the recipient cannot redistribute them, or so
that they may not be used to solicit subjects of the records for any purposes or
under any circumstances will be unconstitutional in those cases where the objective
of the acquisition of the records is speech of the type most protected by the
Constitution. The impact of this proposal may at first seem deep. For example,
under this proposal, the imposition of higher fees on commercial requesters under
the FOIA would be unconstitutional; 30 9 the status of the requester as a commercial
entity, newspaper reporter, non-profit organization, or interested individual has
nothing to do with the quality of the speech that may result from access and use of
the records. The Kansas law barring use of public records to sell any good or
service 310 also would be unconstitutional; 31" it sweeps within its effect all forms of
commercial and arguably commercial speech that might result from use of the
records.
Further, unless the Supreme Court in United States Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press3 2 were willing to uphold a law
forbidding the publication of rap sheets, the Court should have forced the federal
government to disclose the rap sheets to the reporters and allowed them to publish
their news stories regarding the rap sheets.313 The New York court in PropertyTax
Reduction Consultants,Inc. v. Township ofplip314 also erred when it did not allow
the private consulting firm to acquire data for the purposes of supporting citizens
315
in their effort to petition the government for correction of their property tax bills.
Petitioning the government is an essential right and is subject to First Amendment

publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of
government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of
public business. In preserving that form of government the First and Fourteenth
Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose sanctions
on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open
to public inspection.
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn. 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 52 53.
310. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-230(a) (Supp. 2005).
311. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
312. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 115 23.
314. 799 N.Y.S.2d 576 (App. Div. 2005)
315. See supra text accompanying notes 129-34.
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protection; the Property Tax Reduction Consultants' role as a commercial facilitator
of this function does nothing to diminish the value of the speech protected.
Furthermore, denying the consultants the tax records ensures that residents of Islip
will remain ignorant of the appropriate valuation and tax burdens of their homes
because private citizens are unlikely to have the technical resources to analyze the
property records and organize them in support of a demand for tax relief.
This Article does not by any means, however, contend that there can be no
regulation of the uses of public record data; just as speech can be subject to
regulation under the First Amendment, so too can the activities that give rise to the
speech. Addressing the actual dangers of commercial access to public records
should be accomplished in two ways. First, government agencies should redact and
abstract some records to eliminate sensitive information before providing them to
requesters, though the redaction and abstraction should not depend on whether the
requester seeks paper copies or electronic records and whether the requester is a
commercial or noncommercial entity. Second, policymakers should apply general
limitations on commercial activity to commercial entities using public records, but
the restrictions should apply to all commercial activity, notj ust activity based upon
public records. In fact, these two methods for addressing potential dangers are
already in wide use with substantial success. Any new concerns should be remedied
with adjustments rather than creating new kinds of privacy rights.
VI. POLICE BAD CONDUCT, NOT GOOD INFORMATION
Suppressing commercial use of public records in many cases will constitute
suppressing speech based upon the records without regard to whether it is
commercial speech. But the government has other ways of discouraging undesirable
conduct without creating an overreaching ban on commercial use of public records.
One way of doing this is to place conditions on using information about a subject
individual that a second party purchases from a third; a model for this approach
already exists in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Another approach is to regulate
offensive conduct, like certain kinds of solicitations, without regard to the sources
of data used to support it; the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act is a model for this
approach.
A.

FairCredit ReportingAct

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 316 is intended to balance the need for
accurate credit information by businesses and the interests of consumers in privacy,
accuracy of data, and confidentiality. 317 The FCRA applies in any situation where

316. Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. V1, 84 Sta. 1136 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16811681x (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
317. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
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a consumer reporting agency 318 supplies a consumer report319 to any third party to
assist in evaluating the subject of the report for credit, employment (including
promotion), insurance, and certain other authorized uses. 320 The FCRA offers three
types of controls on consumer reports: access, accuracy, and accountability.
In theory, reporting agencies may not release consumer reports tojust anyone.
A reporting agency must make reasonable efforts to verify the identity of the user
ofthe report and obtain the user's certification that the user intends to use the report
for one of the permitted purposes.3 2' However, the circumstances permitting access
are wide and include court order or subpoena; written instructions from the subject;
a user who will use the report in connection with a credit transaction, for
employment purposes, or for underwriting insurance; one otherwise having 322
a
"legitimate business need"; and government agencies in certain circumstances.
Reporting agencies must strive for accuracy. They are obliged to "follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information

318. Id. § 1681a(f).
The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which, for
monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
Id.
319. Id.§ 1681a(d)(I)(A) (C).
The term "consumer report" means any written, oral, or other communication of
any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected
in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the
consumer's eligibility for(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes;
(B) employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 168 lb of this title.
Id.
320. Id.
321. 15 U.S.C. 1681e(a).
Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed
to avoid violations of section 1681c of this title and to limit the furnishing of
consumer reports to the purposes listed under section 168 1b of this title. These
procedures shall require that prospective users of the information identify
themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify
that the information will be used for no other purpose. Every consumer reporting
agency shall make a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective
user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior to furnishing such user
a consumer report. No consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report
to any person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report
will not be used for a purpose listed in section 168 1b of this title.
Id.
322. Id. § 1681b(a)(1)-(3), (5).
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concerning" the subject of a report.323 The information in a consumer report may
include public records, such as court records, but the FCRA limits the extent to
which some may be disclosed based upon how old the public record is.
Bankruptcies, for example, cannot be reported more than ten years after they are
discharged.324
The FCRA makes reporting agencies accountable. For example, the subject of
the report is entitled to be made aware of its contents if the party receiving the
report takes an adverse action 32 5 against the subject of the report.3 26 The FCRA
allows a consumer to demand that the consumer reporting agency disclose to the
consumer the information in the consumer's file, the sources of the information, and
the identities, addresses, and telephone numbers of those who have received copies
ofthe consumer's report during the preceding year.327 Generally, a reporting agency
must reinvestigate any
consumer claim that information in the agency's files or
328
reports is incorrect.
The justification for these regulations is simple: credit reporting and preemployment screening are economic activities which the government traditionally
has great discretion in regulating. 32 9 Because the objective of public records use in
the credit reporting environment is speech that is principally transactional in nature,
the government may regulate not only the form the speech can take (what can be
included in a credit report), but also the activities of the credit reporting agency
prior to the speech (the requirement to maintain accurate data and to permit
consumers to correct inaccurate records).
Some have argued that the FCRA is deficient because it sets low standards for
credit bureaus and insulates them from many kinds of tort liability and because the
credit bureaus are beholden to their financial services customers and regulators,
with consumers coming in a distant third.33° Other commentators, however, take a
different view:
Even with its deficiencies, the self-policing scheme of the
credit reporting system is at least feasible for many consumers
because most injuries caused by inaccurate information in a credit

323. Id. § 1681e(b).
324. Id.§ 1681c(a)(1).
325. Id. § 1681a(k)(1)(B). Adverse action has a statutorily defined meaning:
(1)a denial or cancellation of. an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or
other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of,any
insurance, existing or applied for, in connection with the underwriting of
insurance:
(ii) a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that
adversely affects any current or prospective employee.
Id.The section provides that certain other things may also qualii as adverse actions. Id.
326. See id. § 1681g(a)(2).
327. Id. § 1681g(a)(1)-(3) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
328. Id.§ 1681i(a)(I)(A).
329. See supra Part IV.
330. See HARPER, supra note 182, at 170.
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report will be made known to a consumer shortly after the harm
occurs. The statute requires a user of a credit report, such as a
creditor, employer, or insurance company to whom the consumer
has applied, to inform the consumer if adverse action was taken
in reliance on information in that report. This disclosure must
identify the source of the credit report and tell the consumer that
she has a right to see her report and correct any inaccuracies.
Thus, in the ordinary course of events, a consumer will learn that
a wrong has occurred and will be able to identify the problem by
tracing it to the reporting agency that issued the mistaken credit
history. Outside of the scope of the FCRA, this kind of feedback
information is much less accessible, if at all.33'
The FCRA already extends to any provider of background information used to
make credit, insurance, and employment decisions. A similar regime might be
appropriate for agencies that support housing and other types of business decisions.
To the extent that criticisms of its effectiveness are valid, the FCRA could be
strengthened in a variety of ways.
B.

CurbingAnnoying or Offensive CommercialSolicitations

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) operates and maintains a national "DoNot-Cal I" list under authority of the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act. 3 32 That Act
ratified the FTC's rule governing the list:
It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of
this Rule for a telemarketer to engage in, or for a seller to cause
a telemarketer to engage in, the following conduct: ...
(iii) Initiating any outbound telephone call to a person when:
... (B) that person's telephone number is on the "do-not-call"
registry, maintained by the Commission, of persons who do not
wish to receive outbound telephone calls to induce the purchase
of goods or services.... 313
The FTC rule provides that a telemarketer may not call a person when the person
has placed her name on the Do-Not-Call list. There are, however, a few exceptions
to this prohibition. A person can allow certain businesses to continue calling. This
exception must be in writing and signed by the person granting the exception. 34 A

33 1. James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV.
1. 49-50 (2003).

332. Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (Supp.
IV. 2004)).
333. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(l)(iii)(B) (2006).
334. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(1).
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business may also call a person with whom the business has "an established
business relationship., 335Phone calls made to solicit charitable contributions are not
covered by the Do-Not-Call list.3 36 Finally, phone calls made to any business are
also not covered by the Do-Not-Call prohibitions. 33 A business that uses
telemarketing procedures must scrub its list against the national list every thirty-one
days. 3 8 If a consumer complains that a call violates the rule, the burden is on the
telemarketing company to show that it complied with the regulations. 39
It is difficult to say the precise extent to which the Do-Not-Call list has
alleviated the problem of unwanted solicitations. By all accounts the Do-Not-Call
list has been successful to some degree. In its 2005 Annual Report to Congress, the
FTC provided some evidence of the program's success. 340 According to that report,
a poll conducted by an independent polling organization showed that 73 % of adults
in the United States had registered their home telephone numbers with the list,
while another poll placed that number at 76%.341 These numbers represent an
increase in registrations of approximately one third since 2004.342 According to the
polls, 92% of respondents reported receiving fewer telemarketing calls. 34 3 The
report notes that "[a]s of September 30, 2005, the FTC had received 1,249,312
complaints, which represents approximately one percent" of the registered
telephone numbers on the list. 344 The FTC concluded that this low percentage
number showed that the number of unwanted calls was being reduced. 45 As of the
end of fiscal year 2005, the registry included 107,440,316 telephone numbers.346
The FTC's Annual Report notes that determining the success of the program
as compared to the time before the program's inception can be difficult because the
only existing data on the number of telemarketing calls made prior to 2003 was
anecdotal.34 Even so, the FTC argued, the dramatic yearly jump in phone numbers
registered must be a sign of some success. The media has paid little attention to the
Do-Not-Call issue since the implementation of the FTC rule. It remains unclear
whether the lack of media attention indicates success.
Preventing unwanted telephone solicitations at dinner time may be a substantial
interest of the state, and if so, the Do-Not-Call legislation may be the answer. To

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii).
Id.§ 310.6(a).
Id.§ 310.6(b)(7) (emphasis added).
Id. § 310.4(b)(3)(iv).
Id. § 310.4(b)(3).
FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FY

2005 PURSUANT

TO THE Do-

NOT-CALL IMPLEMENTATION ACT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY

1 (2006). http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/PO34305FiscalYear2005NationalDoNotCallRegistry
Report.pdf.
341. Id.at5.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.at 4. n.8.
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the extent speech is subject to government regulation, those making the solicitation
calls and those supplying and supporting the callers may be regulated and held
accountable for their conduct.
Even if public records and aggregated data were a central cause of identity
theft, reducing the use of public records will not, by itself, deliver great reductions
in fraud and identity theft. Newman and Clarke, researchers in the field of online
crime prevention, offer several approaches to reducing e-commerce crime with
techniques under the control of consumers and their commercial partners without
depriving consumers or commercial entities of access to public records.348 They
suggest numerous efforts, including hardening database defenses by keeping them
behind firewalls in physically secure places and requiring customers to use both
passwords and personal identification numbers, analyzing user patterns to detect
deviant use and offer incentives or "bounties" for employee vigilance, training
consumers to resist too-good-to-be-true offers and penalizing customers for
breaching security, and holding Internet Service Providers responsible for
fraudulent web sites."' Assuming that wrongdoers use public records in committing
e-commerce crime, limiting access to public records will at most address the first
prevention objective, increasing the perceived effort of the criminal, because the
miscreant will have to get the applicable data elsewhere.
None of the regulations in this section poses First Amendment problems. The
state can regulate as necessary to remedy legitimate ills, not by restricting access
to public records, but by restricting offensive conduct not protected by the
Constitution.
C. PotentialObjections
The framework proposed in this Article is subject to at least two criticisms.
First, the Supreme Court's decision in Los Angeles Police Department v. United
ReportingPublishingCorp. may be read to repudiate the very approach proposed
here. Second, as a practical matter, open records laws of the type proposed have not
necessarily ensured government compliance.
The framework developed in this Article largely harmonizes with existing
precedent. But in 1999's United Reporting case, in which the Supreme Court
appeared to support a limitation on access to public records for commercial uses,
the arguments presented here appear not in the majority opinion, but in the
minority. In United Reporting seven members of the Court rejected a facial First
Amendment challenge to a provision in the California Public Records Act (CPRA)
that required requesters of public records that included the addresses of arrested

348. See NEWMAN & CLARKE, supra note 287, at 110. Newman and Clarke argue for situational
prevention crime-fighting to reduce opportunities for e-commerce crime by increasing the perceived
effort of the criminal to effect the crime, increasing the perceived risks to the criminal, reducing the
anticipated rewards for the criminal, and removing excuses of others involved to avoid taking action.
Id. at 10. For a general treatment of situational prevention, see id. at 7 8.

349. See idat 113 15.
350. 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
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individuals to declare that they were using the information solely for journalistic,
scholarly,
political, governmental, or investigative purposes and not for commercial
1
35

uses.

Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that this was not a case in which
speakers were prohibited from conveying information they already had, but was
rather "nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information in its
possession. 352 Moreover, United Reporting had never signed the declarations
required to obtain the records and therefore was never actually denied access to the
records. 353 United Reporting could not challenge the law "'on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the
Court. 354 Therefore, the Chief Justice said, facial invalidation for overbreadth was
inappropriate, 355 though he left open the possibility for an as-applied challenge.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment,
agreeing that insofar as the restriction was "formally nothing but a restriction upon
access to government information, 356 a facial challenge failed. However, Justice
Scalia saw an important distinction in allowing access to some requesters but not
others:
But it is an entirely different question whether a restriction upon
access that allows access to the press (which in effect makes the
information part of the public domain), but at the same time
denies access to persons who wish to use the information for
certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction upon speech
rather than upon access to government information.35
Justices Scalia and Thomas also left the door open for as-applied challenges.5 8
Justice Stevens, in his dissentjoined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, most closely
articulates this Article's perspectives on access to public records for commercial
purposes. Stevens suggests that impermissible viewpoint discrimination was indeed
taking place:
What the State did here, in my opinion, is comparable to that
obviously unconstitutional discrimination. In this case, the denial
of access is based on the fact that respondent plans to publish the
information to others who, in turn, intend to use it for a
commercial speech purpose that the State finds objectionable.
Respondent's proposed publication of the information is

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 34-35.
Id.at 40.
Id.
Id. at 38 (quoting New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747. 767 (1982)).
Id. at 39-40.
Id.at 41 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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indisputably lawful petitioner concedes that if respondent
independently acquires the data, the First Amendment protects its
right to communicate it to others. Similarly, the First Amendment
supports 359
the third parties' use of it for commercial speech
purposes.
Stevens concluded that, accordingly, the restriction on the use was unconstitutional:
It is perfectly clear that California could not directly censor the
use of this information or the resulting speech. It follows, I
believe, that the State's discriminatory ban on access to
information in an attempt to prohibit persons from exercising
their constitutional rights to publish it in a truthful and accurate
manner-is equally invalid.36 °
This Article echoes some of Justice Stevens's arguments that regulations of access
to public records should have to meet the same constitutional requirements as
would regulation of the speech that may be based on the public records.
The Court never reached the merits of the commercial use restriction in United
Reporting.Only Stevens's dissent suggested that the Court should, in effect, go all
the way and consider the statute invalid both facially and as applied, arguing that
the plaintiffs had successfully made both arguments. 361 The Court remanded the
United Reporting case back to the Ninth Circuit for resolution of the as-applied
challenge.3 62 The Ninth Circuit, upon its remand to the district court for additional
fact-finding, noted
that the Supreme Court had left open an as-applied challenge for
363
judicial review.

United Reporting actually signals an important change toward support of the
proposal presented here. Justice Stevens, architect of the Reporters Committee
opinion that appeared to place public records access at the low end of the range of
First Amendment protections, 364 now argues against the type of use-based
restrictions to data access criticized in this Article. This suggests that the Court may
be poised to consider this proposal, if not with a predisposition to approval, then at
least with open minds.
Merely changing the freedom of information laws, however, will not suffice to
achieve the objectives of this proposal. In states with very permissive open records
laws, requesters still face opposition from government officials who want to restrict

359. Id. at 46 (Stevens. J.. dissenting) (citations omitted).
360. Id. at 48 (Stevens. J.. dissenting).
361. Id. at 44-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 41 (majority opinion); United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 231 F.3d
483, 483-84 (9th Cir. 2000).
363. United Reporting, 231 F.3d at 484 ("The Court, at the same time, made clear that several
other grounds for judicial review remain open. One such alternative ground is an as-applied challenge.")
(citation omitted).
364. See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
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access or impose restrictions despite the law. So, for example, in Microdecisions,
Inc. v. Skinner,365 the requester needed to sue to obtain records that should have
been available under Florida's open records law. 66
In other cases, government agencies have hidden behind copyright law and
license agreements with their software vendors to restrict access. Such was the case
in Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 367 where requester
WIREdata had to defend a copyright lawsuit because Assessment Technologies, the
software vendor to a number of municipal and county assessors, sought to prevent
disclosure of public record data to WIREdata. 368 Though Assessment Technologies
won at the trial court, Judge Richard Posner dealt the software vendor a scathing
defeat at the Seventh Circuit:
This case is about the attempt of a copyright owner to use
copyright law to block access to data that not only are neither
copyrightable nor copyrighted, but were not created or obtained
by the copyright owner. The owner is trying to secrete the data in
its copyrighted program a program the existence of which
reduced the likelihood that the data would be retained in a form
in which they would have been readily accessible. It would be
appalling if such an attempt could succeed. 69
Cases of this kind are costly and time-consuming. The Seventh Circuit
eventually awarded WIREdata more than $90,000 in attorney fees against
Assessment Technologies in the copyright action .3 7 It is unknown what fraction of
WIREdata's costs to that date the award represented, but more than three years later
the case was still
winding its way through the Wisconsin state courts on the open
371
records claims.

These developments suggest that proper open records laws are not enough and
that governments must develop an open records culture among their agencies. This
is perhaps no simple task, and these proposals are admittedly only a first step. But
we must take the first step if we hope to achieve an open records culture.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Constitution and federal and state laws protect the right to access public
records. Congress further recognized the importance of access to electronic records

365. 889 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 134-42.
367. 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003). Author Larson acted as copyright subject matter advisor to
WIREdata in this case.
368. Id. at 642.
369. d. at 641-42.
370. Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2004).
371. See WlREdata, Inc. v. Vill. of Sussex, 2007 WI App. 22 (Ct. App. 2007).
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in the 1996 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act. 3 72 Access to public
records is not itself a speech act, but the taint of the commercial speech doctrine
dominates current limitations on access to and use of public records. These
limitations overlook an important fact: while data brokers are widely viewed with
skepticism where large databases are concerned, commercial interests are also
largely the only parties with the resources and motivation to acquire and analyze
the mass of records the government keeps.
Justice Stevens's notion in Reporters Committee of maintaining information as
practically obscure3 73 is no longer an apt description of the way government
agencies and courts gather and hold data. In this era of increased electronic
governmental data-gathering, the public runs the risk that only the government will
have meaningful access to data because it has become impractically obscure. In
many cases, the only way to assess the subject of a given government record will
be to compare it to the treatment of other subjects. The public must be prepared
either to allow the government to police itself or to enlist the assistance of those
who can aggregate and analyze the records and deliver the checking value 74 Even
the press may require commercial assistance to achieve this goal.
Regulation of aggregated public records should be done at the end of the
process rather than at the beginning-based upon the ultimate objective and not the
request. Requesters should be given full access to public records, subject to
legitimate privacy limitations accomplished through abstraction and redaction. The
government should assume that the requester will engage in some activity, whether
commercial or noncommercial, that benefits the public interest rather than assuming
that she will engage in wrongdoing. When wrongdoing takes place, the government
may punish the use, as it has done in its implementation and enforcement of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Do-Not-Call list.
It is commonplace in today's society to bemoan the lack of privacy and to have
serious concerns about personal information contained in public and private
databases. These concerns should not be minimized as some are valid, but the
problem has, in some instances, been exaggerated. To the extent there are legitimate
concerns about public records use, some existing regulations, including the FCRA
and the federal Do-Not-Call list, provide models for addressing them. Regulations
similar in scope and application may be appropriate to other types of conduct.
Many current restrictions and limitations on access to aggregated public records
by commercial requesters would fail to satisfy the test presented here, however, as
they have sweeping effects on speech warranting great First Amendment protection.
Even if courts were to apply the commercial speech doctrine to some speech
resulting from public records use, many existing restrictions on soliciting and
redistributing would be unconstitutional. An application of Central Hudson to a
regulation that prohibits access to aggregated public records should result in the

372. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (2000).
373. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989).
374. See Blasi, supra note 17. at 609-10.
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regulation's failure, particularly if the regulation is inconsistent in its treatment of
public records. Justice Stevens's opinion in GreaterNew Orleans Broadcasting
Association v. United States supports this analysis; if a regulation on commercial
speech is "so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies, 37 5 then it cannot be
reasonably said to advance even an important governmental interest. Regulations
that unduly burden commercial access to aggregated public records while
permitting access to individual records, or that prohibit commercial uses of data
while permitting noncommercial uses, are inconsistent in just the way that the
commercial speech doctrine is.
Commercial uses of public data should not be suspect until it is demonstrated
that the use raises legitimate privacy or other concerns. By providing as much
access as possible to commercial and noncommercial requesters, the government
meets its long-standing and oft-repeated commitments to openness and provides the
possibility for external monitoring and analysis. Where there is a potential for
abuse, the government should take steps to regulate the use of public data rather
than the receipt of it.

375. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999).

